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Chapter 1
Results Concerning the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment1
1.1 Introduction
Ground-level ozone pollution is one of six "criteria pollutants" regulated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS), originally established in the1970 Clean Air Act (CAA or "the
Act").2 The NAAQS for ozone was altered in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA) in order to more eectively decrease ozone pollution. Since the introduction
of the 1990 CAAA through 2004, there has been a statistically signicant decline
in the second highest average annual one-hour ambient ozone concentration (ozone)
measurement from pollution monitors throughout the United States, from 0.127 to
0.104 parts per million (ppm).3 It is not clear if this decrease in ozone is attributable
to the 1990 CAAA however, or if the decline is the result of an increased adoption of
1This is joint research with Assistant Professor Scott Lowe of Boise State University.
2The ozone was originally monitored under a standard for all photochemical oxidants but was
changed specically to ozone in 1979. The other criteria pollutants are: nitrogen oxides (NOx),
sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), lead (Pb) and total suspended particulates (TSPs
- particulate matter (PM) later replaced TSPs). The 1970 CAA is actually an amendment to an
earlier 1963 CAA which placed an entirely dierent agency, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare's National Air Pollution Control Administration, at the helm of national pollution
control. The earlier act was little enforced however, and the establishment of a new agency focused
solely on the environment, perhaps, provides the rationale for why the 1970 CAA is not typically
referred to as an amendment. The EPA's website (www.epa.gov) and documents (especially: U.S
EPA 1996, 2006) as well as Portney and Stavins (2000) provided historical information of the CAA
and its amendments.
3The sample is restricted to ambient emissions measurements between 1990 and 2004 because
the non-attainment regulation on Ozone changed in 2004. More information can be found on the
EPA's website: http://www.epa.gov/ozonedesignations/.
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low emissions technology unrelated to the CAAA, a nationwide shift in production
focus towards non-polluting outputs, or some other cause unrelated to the CAAA.4
Although a non-CAAA explanation for the decline in ozone pollution may seem
unlikely, the results of earlier empirical work on the CAA contain mixed evidence
concerning whether declines in pollution levels should be attributed to the CAA
(Henderson (1996), Greenstone (2004), Auhammer, Bento and Lowe (2005)).
The impact of increased pollution regulation is identied in this paper by com-
paring changes in ambient ozone pollution concentrations across ve non-attainment
categories, each with dierent regulations, established in the 1990 CAAA. Geo-
graphic areas across the United States were created by the EPA and assigned to non-
attainment categories based on an assignment rule established in the 1990 CAAA
and an area level measurement of ozone concentrations known as a "design value".
In this paper, we reproduce the design values and use the regression discontinuity
(RD) design created by the CAAA's assignment rule to estimate the impact of the
dierence in regulations. The RD design creates a quasi-experiment in which areas
with dierent levels of regulation, but similar design values, act as counterfactuals.
By comparing geographic areas with similar design values and using the exogenous
dierence in regulations caused by the assignment rule, a consistent estimate of the
impact between the dierent regulation levels can be found.
The impact of regulation is analyzed over two dierent time periods, for two
dierent types of ozone measurements. Dierent lengths of time are used to address
4The economic literature on the Environmental Kuznet's Curve oers at least one alternate
suggestion to regulation that has motivated technology adoption and a shift in production: con-
sumer demand. Goklany's Clearing the Air (1999) and Torras and Boyce (1998) both summarize
this literature.
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the two dimensions of the 1990 CAAA: regulatory variation exists in terms of the
restrictiveness of regulation imposed as well as the time allotted for a geographic
area to reduce its ambient concentration level below the NAAQS. In addition to two
dierent time periods, two dierent types of ozone measurements are used to answer
two dierent questions. First, the percentage change in design value addresses how
dierent levels of regulation impact the EPA's targeted concentration levels. Sec-
ond, we look at the percentage change in average ambient concentrations in order
to reevaluate a result, originally found by Henderson (1996), of increasing average
pollution concentrations in areas under more regulation. Finding an increase in av-
erage ambient concentrations is of interest because the NAAQS are continually being
enforced at lower concentrations in order to reect current scientic knowledge.5
Our research is the rst that we know of to utilize the multiple regulatory cat-
egories created by the 1990 CAAA to evaluate the impact of the CAA on pollution.6
The prior work by Henderson (1996) analyzed ozone levels between 1977 and 1987,
while Greenstone (2004) focused on sulfur dioxide (SO2), Auhammer et al. (2005)
on particulate matter of 10 micrometers or less (PM10) and Chay and Greenstone
(2003 and 2005) considered total suspended particulates (TSPs) in order to vali-
date non-attainment status as an instrument for reducing ambient pollution levels.7
5The standard was most recently updated to 0.075 ppm over 8-hours on May 27th, 2008.
6Only one other paper has used the multiple non-attainment classications of the 1990 CAAA
but requests not to be cited. It uses descriptive statistics and discusses the demographics that
inuence assignment to focus on the impact of the economy on reducing emissions.
7There have been a number of other papers focusing on attainment designation and employment
(Bartik (1988), McConnell and Schwab (1990), Duy-Deno (1992), Becker and Henderson (2000),
List and Kunce (2000), Berman and Bui (2001), Morgenstern, Pizer and Shih (2002), Greenstone
(2002) and List, McHone and Millimet (2003)) but none are concerned with explaining the impact
on pollution levels.
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The existence of multiple regulation categories in the 1990 CAAA provides an ex-
tension of prior work which has only compared two levels of regulation stemming
from designation as either Attainment or Non-Attainment. The multiple regulation
levels provide additional evidence concerning the ecacy of the CAA by providing
additional instances of regulatory variation.
This paper also contributes to the current literature by accounting for the
EPA's area level assignment and area boundaries which do not always follow county
boundaries as used in prior research (Henderson (1996), Kahn (2000), List, McHone
and Millimet (2003), Chay and Greenstone (2005), Greenstone (2005)).8 Inaccu-
rately assigned boundaries may have led to the incorrect assignment of attainment
status, and corresponding regulation, to a monitor due to its location within a
county. We recreate area boundaries given by the Code of Federal Regulations
in order to avoid any measurement error attributable to inaccurate area bound-
aries. An alternative solution was taken in Auhammer et al. (2005), which used
non-attainment status assigned at the city level to address a related regulation as-
signment issue concerning the targeting of regulation towards more heavily polluted
locations within counties. In order to understand what impact the dierent levels of
observation used in previous research have on the outcomes this paper briey con-
siders what questions are answered for three dierent levels of observation: monitor,
county and area, and presents results for each. Finally, an RD design has not pre-
viously been used to analyze the CAA, although an assignment rule has been used
8This "boundary issue" is pointed out in Henderson (1996) and Greenstone (2005), and both
mark counties as non-attainment if any portion of the county is in non-attainment.
4
by the EPA for some time. We provide evidence that an assumption of county level
assignment has hindered use of an RD design in the past and that an RD design is
reasonable once area level assignment is recognized although the results are hindered
by the reduction in sample size.
Before discussing the previous literature further, it is helpful to review the 1990
CAAA to establish some terminology and become familiar with the Act's incentives
to reduce emissions. Thus, this paper continues with a brief yet detailed review of
the 1990 CAAA. This is followed by a review of the economic literature pertaining to
the impact of the CAA on pollution. Our research design is then presented followed
by the data used and an outline of the estimation procedure. Finally, the results
are presented. The results concerning the impact of regulation on the percentage
change in design values are mainly insignicant. The lack of signicance is likely
due to the constrained sample size when using the appropriate level of regulation:
the area level. Although the results are mainly insignicant, they are suggestive
that increased regulation has led to increased declines in pollution. A main nding
of this paper is the extent that the results depend on the level of observation used.
The variation in results suggests that care needs to be taken determining what level
of observation is appropriate for the research question being posed.
1.2 Non-Attainment categories of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
Prior to the 1990 CAAA, the NAAQS for ozone required that every monitor
within an attainment area have no more than a single violation of the 0.12 ppm one-
5
hour standard, per year.9 An area failing to meet the NAAQS was labeled as "non-
attainment", resulting in heightened restrictions on pollution sources. After the 1990
CAAA, the main 0.12 ppm attainment standard, originally set in 1979, remained,
but the single non-attainment classication was replaced with ve non-attainment
categories with varying federally imposed restrictions. Each year beginning in 1990
and ending 2004, an area's design value has been used to designate areas into a
non-attainment category according to the following rule (applicable range of design
value): Attainment (less than 0.121),Marginal (0.121 - 0.137 ppm),Moderate (0.138
- 0.160 ppm), Serious (0.160 - 0.180 ppm), Severe (0.180 - 0.280 ppm) and Extreme
(greater than 0.280 ppm).10
A monitor's design value for a given year is determined using one-hour average
ambient ozone readings from the previous three years. The one hour averages from
the past 3 years are ordered by size and, depending on how often the monitor was
measuring ambient ozone, the 4th, 3rd, 2nd or 1st largest one hour average is used
as the design value.11 The EPA uses the highest design value reading from all the
monitor design values within an area as the area's design value for that year. The
EPA uses the highest monitor readings because scientic studies suggested short
9The NAAQS includes two standards, neither of which require nor expect economic costs to
be considered: a primary standard to protect health and a secondary standard to protect welfare.
Primary and secondary standards have always been equal for ozone.
10CAA Section 181. There are 9 categories in total: a "transitional" category was used for special
cases of areas that were deemed temporarily in Moderate non-attainment, the Severe category is
separated into Severe-15 and Severe-17 categories and a "non-attainment insucient data" category
exists in the CFR. The transitional and insucient data categories were not used as it was not
clear what regulation was imposed. The Severe categories were combined due to the already
restricted sample size. Although, as written, two categories include the same reading (0.138 for
both Marginal and Moderate for example) the language of the CAAA implies that the "better"
category contains all readings less than the upper value while the "worse" category is greater than
or equal to the lower value.
11See Appendix A for complete details on design value calculation.
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periods of highly concentrated ozone exposure posed the most signicant threat to
public health and the environment.12
An area level design value was used as the assignment value for all areas ex-
cept those assigned by a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) "grouping-rule". The
MSA grouping-rule was developed to assign areas within the same MSA or Consoli-
dated MSA (CMSA) to the non-attainment status of the worst non-attainment area
of that MSA or CMSA, if the worst area was in Serious, Severe or Extreme non-
attainment.13 However, the MSA rule could be avoided if sucient evidence was
provided by state agencies indicating that an area within the MSA would not con-
tribute signicantly to ozone. As an example, the areas with lower pollution within
the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County CMSA were considered separately from
the area within the CMSA containing the South Coast Air Quality Management
District.14
The main restrictions for areas labeled as non-attainment, regardless of cat-
egory, come through the submission of a state implementation plan (SIP) to the
EPA. An SIP is a detailed plan of intent concerning how non-attainment areas will
decrease pollution to meet and retain attainment status. The EPA may approve
12As detailed by the EPA, the NAAQS were established and updated based on a lengthy review
process which included use of current scientic studies and assessments by interested parties. It
is important to point out that some research indicates health impacts non-linear in exposure to
ambient concentrations (Hazuchaa and Lefohnb (2007)).
13CAA Section 107.d.4.A.iv
14Although it is important to be aware of the MSA grouping-rule, it only appears to have been
applied in two cases: 1) the cleaner area within the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County CMSA
received a Severe non-attainment assignment although its calculated design value would have
designated it as Serious, and 2) an area within the Boston-Worcester-Lawrence CMSA received a
Severe non-attainment assignment rather than a Moderate.
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an SIP, call for changes or, in a worst case scenario, mandate federal controls.15
Further, an area faces penalties, such as the withholding of federal highway funds,
for not abiding by an SIP.16 SIPs are intended to provide exibility by allowing each
area to have a separate plan to achieve attainment, while also being restrictive given
the requirement of federal approval dependent upon the SIP satisfying requirements
outlined in the 1990 CAAA.
The set of requirements for an SIP become more restrictive as the non-attainment
status becomes worse. For clarity, "worse" here refers to a greater failure of the
attainment standard. For example, the Severe non-attainment designation requires
more stringent controls and rules be enacted than Marginal non-attainment designa-
tion. As an example of the requirements for an SIP, the restrictions on mobile sources
require mandatory vehicle inspections but under guidelines wihth some exibility for
Marginal areas, installation of gasoline vapor recovery systems for Moderate areas,
specic guidelines for emissions testing during inspections for Serious areas, a plan
to control work related vehicle miles traveled for Severe areas and a plan to control
trac during heavy trac hours in Extreme areas. Further, the requirements are
monotonically increasing: Worse non-attainment categories are subject to all of the
requirements of the better non-attainment categories in addition to their own.
Separately from the SIP requirements, restrictions on pollution sources exist
which also vary by non-attainment status. For example, new "major sources" of pol-
15Recently in 2003, a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) was imposed on Laurel, Montana after
the EPA partially disapproved the SIP for SO2 (Code of Federal Regulation - 40 CFR 52).
16An example of withholding of federal highway funds: Loftis, Randy Lee "EPA threat on smog
is most Serious yet, Possibility of losing millions of dollars in funding could stir legislative action"
The Dallas Morning News May 5, 1999
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lution in non-attainment areas must install technology meeting the lowest achievable
emissions rate (LAER), with little or no regard to economic feasibility, as well as
oset the emissions generated. A major source is any new source with the poten-
tial to emit more than 100 tons of pollution per year for Moderate and Marginal
areas, decreasing to 75, 50 and 25 tons per year for Serious, Severe and Extreme
areas respectively.17 Further, the emissions osets used to satisfy the major source
regulation begin at a ratio of 1.1 to 1 (oset to emitted) for Marginal areas and
increase to 1.15, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.5 to 1 for Moderate, Serious, Severe and Extreme
non-attainment areas, respectively. In comparison to non-attainment areas, the def-
inition of a major source in an attainment area may be relaxed to include only
pollution sources emitting more than 250 tons per year. Further, a major source in
an attainment area must only install the best available control technology (BACT),
which considers the economic aspects of the new pollution source.18
It is important to point to a second dimension of the non-attainment regula-
tions that does not become more restrictive as the non-attainment categories become
worse: the attainment status deadline. The deadline for achieving attainment with
an ambient concentration of 0.12 ppm relaxes with the degree of attainment failure:
three years for Marginal, six years for Moderate, nine years for Serious, fteen years
for Severe and twenty years for Extreme. The consequences of failing a deadline
consist of non-attainment category reassignment and the requirement to submit a
17A major source may be an existing source which is expanding operations.
18It is not clear how the decision to relax the denition of a major source is made, the EPA only
discloses that it is "depending upon the source" http://www.epa.gov/nsr/info.html.
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new SIP.19 The 1990 CAAA also included "milestones" in order to verify that areas
under non-attainment categories with longer deadlines had eective SIPs.20 The
main milestone comes six years after the enactment of the Act, with additional
milestones every three years thereafter. The six year milestone is a requirement for
all non-attainment areas, other than Marginal, to reduce volatile organic compound
(VOC) emissions which contribute directly to ozone formation, by 15% from the
emissions level in 1990.21
1.3 Previous Literature
Henderson (1996) rst evaluated the impact of the CAA on ozone pollution
using a xed eects model with monitor-level panel data from 1977, 1982, 1985 and
1987. The impact of a non-attainment status dummy variable was measured against
the natural log of four dependent variables: the second highest daily maximum
emission reading for the year, the mean annual reading, the median daily maximum
in July and the mean July reading. Of the four pollution measures, ozone non-
attainment only had a signicant impact (5% condence level) when median daily
maximum readings in July were used as the outcome variable. The reduction in
ozone attributed to non-attainment status, when signicant, was 8%.
A xed eect model identies the impact of non-attainment status through
areas that change non-attainment designation over the time period of the analysis.
For Henderson (1996), 18% of his sample changed attainment status. A lack of
19CAA 181.b.2
20CAA 182.g
21CAA 182.b.1. Marginal areas were under a 3-year deadline to achieve attainment.
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change in non-attainment status led Greenstone (2004) to use regressions with xed
eects only at the state-level to evaluate county-level annual mean SO2 measure-
ments over three separate six-year periods: 1975 - 1980, 1981 - 1986 and 1987 -
1992.22 Greenstone analyzed the impact that the fourth year's attainment status
(1978, 1984 and 1990 respectively) had on one, two and three year changes in county-
level SO2 measurements, relative to the middle year of each period (1977, 1983 and
1989 respectively). Of Greenstone's results, only those from the nal six-year period
are signicant and suggest non-attainment status caused a 7-11% decrease in SO2.
23
Both Henderson (1996) and Greenstone (2005) label counties with both non-
attainment and attainment portions as being in non-attainment. This occurs be-
cause assignment level is at the area, not county, level and area boundaries may not
follow county boundaries. It is not clear how severely this aects their estimates
but it is clear that it may. County level assignment will aect estimates if two ar-
eas with dierent non-attainment statuses exist within a county, each with its own
ozone monitor. For example, consider gure 1.1 which displays the San Francisco
and Sacramento region of California with the multiple 1990 non-attainment clas-
sications given by the legend, county boundaries delineated by lines and monitor
locations indicated by black dots. The county labeled "A" is El Dorado, California
and the dierent colors of the county show the two non-attainment designations
which split the county in two areas, each containing monitors. We refer to these
22Greenstone made other determinations when analyzing the data: using the 2nd highest emis-
sions level rather than DV although DV is not always second highest and reducing the sample to
those only report 75% of the time or more when the DV is adjusted (still measured) for such areas.
23Insignicant results from other periods suggest that up to a 17% decrease may be attributable
to non-attainment status..
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Figure 1.1: Sacramento CA (Area) Ozone Attainment Classications
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counties as either "split" or "partial" counties and use them as a level of observa-
tion in place of counties. Only thirty-eight of the more than 3000 counties of the
United States contain more than one area, but monitors are not located in every
county. Restricting the sample of counties to the 338 counties with reported mon-
itor readings in 1990 and 2004, 25 contain multiple areas and they are often heavy
polluting counties such as Los Angeles. In order to avoid any possible bias, area
boundaries given by the Code of Federal Regulations were carefully accounted for
in our analysis.
An issue similar to incorrectly assigning attainment status according to county
boundaries was brought up by Auhammer, Bento and Lowe (2005). During con-
versations with air quality management district ocials, Auhammer et al. were
told that cities within the same non-attainment area may face dierent regulatory
restrictions due to targeting that is not explicitly part of the CAA. The air quality
management district ocials indicated that cities with higher pollution were tar-
geted to bring about the largest health benets and cause a pollution reduction in
line with the NAAQS. Auhammer et al. (2005) accounted for this in their analysis
by comparing county level and sub-county level assignment and their results sup-
port an attenuation bias: an insignicant decrease in average PM10 emissions from
1990 to 2000 in California is attributable to non-attainment status at the county
level, while a signicant decrease is found when city level non-attainment status is
used in the analysis. Although Auhammer et al. provide a reasonable solution to
determine the level of regulation within an area, it remains to be determined what
observation level should be used to analyze the CAA.
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The design of the 1990 CAAA implies that a decline in area level ozone,
specically area design values, was the primary target of the amendment regardless
of what the larger intent of the EPA may have been. Because area design values
were the primary target, using an area level observation would best determine the
eectiveness of the 1990 CAAA in achieving its goal. However, from a research
stand point, change in ambient ozone concentrations at the monitor level would be
appropriate to gauge the impact of the CAA more broadly, so long as regulation
is appropriately accounted for as in Auhammer et al. (2005). For these reasons,
results are presented here for both changes in area and monitor level emissions. We
also report results at the county level in order to provide comparisons to previous
research.24
1.4 Research Design
We use the variation in regulation between non-attainment categories in order
to determine the impact of increased pollution restrictions by comparing changes in
ozone pollution over time between "neighboring" categories. Neighboring categories
refer to categories which share a cuto point, such as Marginal and Moderate, and
Serious and Severe. The analysis focuses on neighboring categories because of the
RD estimation procedure used but regression results are also reported which do not
limit the results to neighboring categories. Because the design value is the EPA's
24Because assignment occurs at the area level, counties cannot be used to determine the eec-
tiveness of the CAA. Using counties as the level of observation would be valid to determine the
general impact of the CAA if a county level attainment status was determined and regulation was
assumed to have been uniformly applied to all monitors within a county. However, Auhammer
et al. (2005) suggests that targeting occurred within counties.
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targeted ozone pollution measurement, focus is placed on the change in design values
although the change in average ambient ozone is also considered. The RD estima-
tion procedure ensures that observations that are similar (other than treatment) are
compared, but percentage changes are used in order to remove any starting point
bias that may come from areas with high initial levels of pollution. Pollution mea-
surements for 1990 are used as the initial year for percentage calculations because
1990 was the last year before the 1990 CAAA would have had an impact. However,
two dierent time periods are used in order to address the two dimensions of each
category's regulation: restrictions and attainment deadline.
It is necessary to compare the non-attainment categories of the 1990 CAAA,
rather than compare the 1990 CAAA with the CAA prior to 1990, because no areas
remained under pre-1990 non-attainment regulation after 1990.25 Without areas
under pre-1990 regulation there are no control observations so that the overall impact
of the 1990 CAAA cannot be directly assessed without making assumptions and
simulating pollution declines.26 Instead, the question addressed here, by comparing
dierent categories, is what relative impact the dierent sets of regulations had
on pollution. This question is notably dieren from a direct determination of the
eectiveness of the 1990 CAAA but does not preclude all discussion because the
variation in regulation creates testable hypotheses which allow inference concerning
the Act's eectiveness. The main hypotheses stems from the assumption which
25Attainment areas prior to 1990 remained under the same regulation post 1990 if they remained
in attainment, however, it is a comparison of pre-1990 non-attainment regulations and post-1990
non-attainment category regulations that would be of interest.
26U.S. EPA (1997 and 1999) used assumptions and simulation to analyze the impact of the CAA.
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follows from regulations in more restrictive areas containing all of the regulations in
less restrictive areas (and thus being more restrictive with certainty):
H1: if the 1990 CAAA were eective, areas under more restrictive regulations should
have resulted in declines in ozone that were no smaller in magnitude than areas under
less strict regulation, ceteris paribus.
In order to test this main hypothesis, the two dimensions of the non-attainment
regulation are addressed by using dierent outcome variables. Each outcome vari-
able is a percentage change rather than an absolute change. Percentage changes
are used in order to not bias the reduction due to an observations inital level of
pollution. This bias may occur due to variation in the diculty of reductions re-
lated to the existing pollution level. The decision to use percentage changes does
not perfectly coincide with the main hypothesis above but we feel that correcting
for the initial level of pollution is important.
The main outcome variable is the percentage change in design values over




where NA denotes which non-attainment classication the observation falls under,
TNA is either the appropriate deadline year for non-attainment classication NA or
the cuto year of 2004, whichever is greater, and Ot is a general representation for an
ozone measurement in year t (i.e. either a design value or average ambient ozone).
As an example, the percentage change in the design value from 1990 through 1993
is used for observations in Marginal non-attainment, yDMarginal, while the change
in the design value from 1990 through 1996 is used for observations in Moderate
non-attainment yDModerate. The dierent lengths of time are for a specic outcome
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measurement and results with outcomes using a uniform length of time are also
discussed. Although this "deadline" analysis will provide an understanding of how
the 1990 CAAA categories compared in reducing pollution, it will not separately
identify the impact of regulatory restrictions from the dierent amounts of time
provided under each category's deadline.
In order to determine the impact of each category's deadline separately from
the increased SIP requirements and restrictions, we would need observations that
vary in restrictions under the same attainment deadline as well as observations under
the same restrictions but dierent attainment deadlines. The six year milestone men-
tioned previously most resembles the former scenario because each non-attainment
category is under the same six year time deadline for a reduction in the ozone con-
tributing VOC pollutant. Because a better opportunity does not exist to exploit
varying restrictions under the same deadline and VOC levels have a direct impact
on ozone pollution, we use the six year milestone to consider the impact of increased
restrictions by analyzing the percentage change in design values from 1990 to 1996.




. This "milestone" outcome variable provides the most direct test of whether areas
under more restrictive regulation reduce pollution by no less than areas under less
restrictive regulation.
It is possible that the dierent non-attainment deadlines impact an area's
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Figure 1.2: Yearly Average Area DV Percentage Change by NA Category
pollution reduction timeline, and thus would inuence an analysis using milestone
outcomes by confounding the impact of the restrictions with the impact of the dead-
lines.27 Unfortunately, observations varying by attainment deadlines but under the
same restrictions do not exist. A brief look at how emissions reductions uctuate
over time addresses some of the concern that deadlines inuence an area's pollution
reduction over time. Figure 1.2 plots one year average percentage changes in area-
level design values across time for the dierent non-attainment groups, with the
percentage changes from year t to t+1 plotted in year t. The gure shows roughly
similar declines over time with the exception of the Extreme category and the Severe
27Theoretically, it is not clear what impact dierent levels of regulation have on the time taken
to reduce emissions. See Appendix A for a theoretical model.
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category around 1998.28 A regression of one year average changes on yearly xed
eects, non-attainment categories and interactions of year and category, supports
these graphical inferences with the only signicant dierence being the Severe cat-
egory in 1998 and a signicant increase in the Serious category in 2002. Neither
of these dierences provides strong evidence to suggest that deadlines do have a
substantial inuence on when pollution is reduced and provides some evidence that
deadlines do not substantially inuence the interpretation of the "milestone" anal-
ysis. Again, there is unfortunately no way to fully separate the two dimensions of
the non-attainment category regulations.
The focus of this analysis is on comparing area design values which are the
ozone measurement of interest to the EPA. However, a percentage change in average
ambient ozone levels could also be evaluated to consider Henderson's (1996) earlier
results suggesting that ozone reductions follow the "letter of the law" rather than the
intent of the law. However, this nding no longer holds as shown in gures 1.3 and 1.4
which are comparable to gures 1.1 and 1.2 given by Henderson (1996) but reect
our more recent data.29 Figures 1.3 and 1.4 display shifts downward in both the
distribution of the design value and of one-hour average annual means, indicated by
the solid line for 1990 and the dashed line for 2004.30 As in Henderson (1996), there
28A regression of one year average changes on yearly xed eects, non-attainment categories
and interactions of year and category, supports these graphical inferences with the only signicant
dierence being the Severe category in 1998 and a signicant increase in the Serious category in
2002.
29Only monitors, counties or areas with ozone measurements in both years were used to avoid
biasing the results due to removal of existing and placement of new monitors (Greenstone(2004)).
30Figure 1.3 and 1.4 restrict the sample size to those monitors with design value measurements
for 1990 and 2006 and annual mean measurements in 1990 and 2005. Each average is given by
the vertical lines of the corresponding solid or dashed line in the gures. The vertical dotted line
marks 0.12 ppm standard in gure 1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of Annual Mean Monitor DVs
Figure 1.4: Distribution of Annual Mean Monitor One-Hour Averages
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is a statistically signicant decline in the ozone measurement of primary interest to
the EPA, but unlike Henderson (1996) the more recent data also shows a decline
in the annual hourly-average. Our analysis indicates that the average design value
declines signicantly from 0.146 ppm to 0.110 ppm, between 1990 and 2004. This
is accompanied by statistically signicant decline in the average annual mean from
0.056 to 0.050, between 1990 and 2004. These results suggest that areas are now
meeting the intent of the CAA and not just the "letter of the law."
There are some concerns to this research design. First, using the 1990 design
value as a control variable used to designate areas into a non-attainment category
as well as part of one of the outcomes would typically cause endogeneity issues of
simultaneity. However, this type of endogeneity is not an issue here due to the
exogeneity of the 1990 CAAA assignment rule and the RD estimation technique
used. The assignment rule would not have been exogenous had areas known of it
well enough ahead of time to react and adjust emissions to achieve a certain non-
attainment designation. It is unlikely that areas could aect their initial designation
in this way considering the events leading up to the 1990 CAAA.31
31As early as the end of the previous deadline for meeting the ozone standard, December 31, 1987,
there was talk of amending the CAA to include variation in deadlines dependent on the degree of
failure. However, it appears no information concerning the actual non-attainment designations was
known (M. Wald "E.P.A. Plans Flexible Deadlines on Air Pollution" New York Times November
11, 1987). Information concerning the designation of non-attainment status rst became known
during the year and a half long process, starting on June 12th 1989 when President Bush proposed
the changes, of signing the amendments into law on November 15, 1990. However, over that time
the cuto points for the non-attainment categories varied and were not given as nal until May
of 1990 (Version two of the House bill: 101 H.R. 3030.). Further, the monitor readings used to
form the rst designation was typically taken from 1987 through 1989, making it unlikely that any
area could attempt to alter its readings to fall in a desired non-attainment designation (Federal
Register 40 CFR 81 Vol. 56 No. 215 November 6, 1991 pg. 56697). Thus, the group designations
may be considered an exogenous event though the signing of the 1990 CAAA and the likelihood of
multiple non-attainment designations was known ahead of time. More importantly, it is unlikely
that areas would ever have been able to alter the monitor readings themselves.
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Second, although it is reasonable to assume that areas could not select their ini-
tial non-attainment designation, areas may change non-attainment categories after
the 1990 designation. Areas changed non-attainment categories after 1990 mainly
in response to changes in ozone pollution, but the EPA did approve the Sacra-
mento (California) Metro Area's proposal to be moved from a Serious to a Severe
non-attainment classication in 1995.32 This selection into a higher category is
troubling but appears to have only occurred for Sacramento. Obviously, any change
in attainment status alters the level of regulation an area is subject to. Because
of the possibility of changes in non-attainment designation after 1990, the results
presented here must be interpreted as the impact of the regulations from the initial
non-attainment assignment in 1990.
Finally, the 0.121 ppm attainment level presents two issues. First, this attain-
ment level existed prior to the 1990 CAAA and areas may have already initiated
plans to decrease emissions. Any trend of decreasing concentrations that existed be-
fore 1990 may confound the analysis, however, given our analysis this would only be
true if the trends were correlated with the multiple breaks in regulation of the new
non-attainment groups. Second, because each non-attainment group has the same
goal of attainment at 0.121 ppm, it is unlikely that there will be very large dierences
32The 1994 California SIP states:"(Sacramento) proposes a bump-up in classication from Se-
rious to Severe, which allows the region to design a strategy that attains by 2005. Although
every eort was made to show attainment by the Serious area deadline of 1999, no feasible control
strategy could be identied to meet that timeframe. The full benets of new state and federal
measures, which are dependent on vehicle turnover, will not be realized by 1999. Because of this,
extraordinary local measures would have to be imposed in the Sacramento region to meet a 1999
deadline. These measures would cause Severe disruptions to the regional economy and were there-
fore deemed infeasible." Approval is recorded in the Federal Register, February 9, 1996 Vol. 61
No. 28 pp. 4887 - 4890.
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in outcomes across non-attainment categories. That is, because the estimation pro-
cedure focuses on observations with similar starting points and the attainment goal
is the same across non-attainment categories at 0.121 ppm, dierences across non-
attainment groups are expected to be small (especially for the deadline outcome,
yD).
1.5 Data
To the best of our knowledge, all previous studies of non-attainment status
with the CAAAs and their impacts on improvements in ambient air quality have
utilized county-level non-attainment measures. A closer inspection of the Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) (1991) reveals that some non-attainment designations
do not adhere strictly to the county boundaries.33 In these cases, the spatial char-
acteristics of the non-attainment designations are not based on political boundaries
or subdivisions, but rather on major roads, rivers, national forests, or air quality
management areas (airsheds), to name but a few. Regardless of the divergence from
the sociopolitical boundary, the inaccurate assignment of non-attainment bound-
aries from the CFR may have led to the incorrect assignment of non-attainment
classications to the monitors within those boundaries.
A major contribution of this paper is that the CAAA non-attainment area
33For example, El Dorado County in California is Serious non-attainment for ozone, however
there are portions that are in attainment. Specically: "All portions of the county except that
portion of El Dorado County within the drainage area naturally tributary to Lake Tahoe including
said Lake" (CFR 1991). In this specic case, the master list of monitors includes four monitors
in the attainment "drainage" area of Lake Tahoe, and four monitors located in the Serious non-
attainment portion of the County.
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boundaries have been correctly accounted for in the data by using GIS tools and
the exact area descriptions reported in the CFR.34 Specically, any areas that have
attainment or non-attainment designations that deviate from the ocial county
boundaries outlined by the United States Geological Survey in the National Atlas
were hand-coded into the GIS.35 Using the correct non-attainment boundaries and
the specic geographic coordinates for each ambient air quality monitor, the attain-
ment status of each area was used to correctly assign non-attainment status to the
monitors within those boundaries.36
For each monitor, the four highest one-hour ozone levels for each year from
1987 through 2004 were obtained from the EPA. These values were used to calculate
design values according to an EPA memorandum from June 18th, 1990 (details in
Appendix A). A monitor's design value for a given year is determined using one-
hour average ambient ozone readings from the previous three years. The one hour
averages from the past 3 years are ordered by size and, depending on how often
the monitor was measuring ambient ozone, the 4th , 3rd , 2nd or 1st largest one hour
average is used as the design value.37 The EPA uses the highest design value reading
from all the monitor design values within an area as the area's design value for that
34As recorded for each state in Title 40 Part 81of the CFR.
35By county, we mean any "primary" or "rst-order" subdivision of a State. Some States refer to
their primary subdivisions by names other than "counties", including parishes, election districts,
boroughs or independent cities. In these cases we treat the parish, election district, borough or
independent city as we do the county in the remainder of our sample. For ozone non-attainment, the
States that presented multiple attainment and/or non-attainment classications within the same
contiguous counties were Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia and Washington.
36Only thirty-eight of the more than 3000 counties of the United States contain more than one
area, but monitors are not located in every county. Restricting the sample of counties to the 338
counties with reported monitor readings in 1990 and 2004, 25 contain multiple areas and they are
often heavy polluting counties such as Los Angeles.
37See Appendix A for complete details on design value calculation.
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year. The highest monitor readings are used for the design value because scientic
studies suggested that short periods of highly concentrated ozone exposure posed
the most signicant threat to public health and the environment.38
The area level design value was used as the assignment value for all areas except
those assigned by a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) "grouping-rule". The MSA
grouping-rule was developed to assign areas within the same MSA or Consolidated
MSA (CMSA) to the non-attainment status of the worst non-attainment area of that
MSA or CMSA, if the worst area was in Serious, Severe or extreme non-attainment.39
However, the MSA rule could be avoided if sucient evidence was provided by state
agencies indicating that an area within the MSA would not contribute signicantly
to ozone. As an example, the areas with lower pollution within the Los Angeles-
Riverside-Orange County CMSA were considered separately from the area within
the CMSA containing the South Coast Air Quality Management District.40
In addition to non-attainment classications and ambient ozone concentra-
tions, we also utilize data from the 1990 census. Census variables serve two related
purposes: 1) a balance check of how the treatment and control samples compare
and 2) controls for parametric regressions which allow for use of more observations.
Tract level data from the 1990 census, broken down by non-attainment category and
38As detailed by the EPA, the NAAQS were established and updated based on a lengthy review
process which included use of current scientic studies and assessments by interested parties. It
is important to point out that some research indicates health impacts non-linear in exposure to
ambient concentrations (Hazuchaa and Lefohnb (2007)).
39CAA Section 107.d.4.A.iv
40Although it is important to be aware of the MSA grouping-rule, it only appears to have been
applied in two cases: 1) the cleaner area within the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange County CMSA
received a Severe non-attainment assignment although its calculated design value would have
designated it as Serious, and 2) an area within the Boston-Worcester-Lawrence CMSA received a
Severe non-attainment assignment rather than a Moderate.
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aggregated to the partial county and area level, is displayed in table 1.1.
Census variables included in table 1.1 are those that are believed to in some
way inuence the production of ozone precursor pollutants, including nitrogen oxides
(NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) which produce Ozone (O3) through
a photochemical process. VOCs are found in a number of household products, such
as paints, glues and printers, and are produced during the manufacturing of these
products as well as many other chemicals. A majority of NOx pollution comes from
agricultural production and mobile sources.41 Contributors to VOCs and NOx thus
include agents in the local economies, and other human pollution sources, while
inhibitors include social-political variables that would decrease these pollutants in-
directly.
1.6 Estimation Procedure: Regression Discontinuity
In addition to linear regression, Greenstone (2004) used propensity score match-
ing to evaluate how non-attainment status impacted SO2 concentrations. Green-
stone used propensity score matching rather than regression discontinuity because
he determined that non-attainment status was not "mechanically assigned". How-
ever, the inability to determine the assignment rule may have been a result of assign-
ing non-attainment status at the county level. Although assignment is not exact,
gures 1.5 , 1.6 and 1.7 demonstrate that the 1990 CAAA assignment rule for ozone
is more closely followed when the appropriate area level is considered rather than
the partial-county level.
41U.S Emissions Inventory 2005, EPA.
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Table 1.1: County or Partial County and Area Demographics by Attainment Status
(1990 Census)
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Figure 1.5: 'First Stage' Monitor Level
Figure 1.6: 'First Stage' County/Split Level
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Figure 1.7: 'First Stage' Area Level
Figures 1.5 , 1.6 and 1.7 relate our calculated 1990 design values on the hor-
izontal axis to 1990 non-attainment (NA) status on the vertical axis. The gures
dier by the observation level used. Figures 1.5 is at the monitor level, gure 1.6 is
at the county of partial county level and gure 1.7 is at the area level. Thus, each
dot on the gures represents either a monitor (gure 1.5), a county (gure 1.6)
or an area (gure 1.7).The sample for each graph is restricted to observations with
design values in both 1990 and 1996.42 As mentioned previously, non-attainment
assingment is at the area level and area boundaries may not follow county bound-
42As pointed out previously by Greenstone (2004), monitors are placed in areas of high pollution
and removed from areas of low pollution over time. The sample is restricted to avoid bias because
monitors are more likely to be removed from areas achieving attainment. 1990 and 1996 are chosen
here because that is the one of a dierence in those years is one of the outcomes of interest, other
combinations tell the same story.
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aries. The monitor level is the most disaggregated as there may be multiple monitors
within a country and multiple counties within an area. The number of observations
in each gure typically decreases as the level of observation aggregates because par-
tial county and area design values are calculated as the highest monitor design value
within the county and area respectively.43
If ozone assignment followed the 1990 CAAA perfectly, each non-attainment
category in gures 1.5 , 1.6 and 1.7 would only show observations between one set of
vertical lines denoting a change in category, also known as the discontinuity points:
0.121, 0.138, 0.160, 0.180 and 0.280 ppm. For example, all design values falling
between 0.138 and 0.160 would be given a Moderate non-attainment designation
and those would be the only Moderate non-attainment designations. As can be seen
in gure 1.6, there is overwhelming evidence that observations do not follow the
assignment rule at the county level, which is the level of assignment used by Green-
stone (2005). However, gure 1.7 shows that instances of observations not assigned
according to the assignment rule drop dramatically when area level assignment is
used. This suggests that the 1990 CAAA assignment rule is followed and RD is an
appropriate method of analysis so long as the correct level of assignment is used.
Figure 1.7 does show that some areas do not appear to be assigned according
to the 1990 CAAA assignment rule and our calculated design values. This "mis-
assignment" may occur if the EPA occasionally assigned areas by unobservable or
43It is possible for the observation count to increase because some partial-counties and areas
will have dierent monitors that start a period and end a period which will individually not be
included in the monitor count because each monitor alone does not both start and end a period.
Another caveat is that two counties split after the 1990 designation: Charles City County, VA
and King County WA; they have been included in the analysis as non-partial counties because our
analysis is as of the 1990 designation.
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observable attributes other than or in addition to an area's design value. It is not
possible to know for certain what may have led the EPA to this decision but one can
imagine the EPA not designating an area into a more restrictive category if the area
was subject to a severe weather event that impacted the photochemical production
of ozone in the years leading up to 1990. Fortunately, selection by unobservable
and observable variables is addressed by using a "fuzzy" RD design, which weights
a strict RD estimate according to the "fuzziness", or the number and degree of
mis-assigned observations around the discontinuity point.
Further, although propensity score matching accounts for selection on observ-
ables and appears to be a natural choice for dealing with a fuzzy RD design, Imbens
and Lemiuex (2008) point to the ignorability assumption underlying propensity score
matching as a reason to avoid using matching when an assignment rule exists. The
essence of the argument is that a fundamental dierence must exist between two
observations with similar design values that were not placed in the same category
by the assignment rule. If the dierence that led to the placements is expected not
to impact an outcome, than the ignorability assumption needed for propensity score
matching is understandable. However, in the case of assignment to a regulation, it is
hard to imagine the unobserved dierence not aecting the reduciton of pollution as
that is likely why the EPA chose to place the areas in dierent categories although
they had similar design values.44
44Battistin and Rettore (2008) work through a divergent though related use of regression dis-
continuity. They suggest that the known discontinuity in an RD design can be used to validate
the ignorability assumption away from the discontinuity point by testing for selection bias once
covariates are controlled for around the discontinuity. Essentially, covariates are used to control for
the unobserved dierences that Imbens and Lemiuex (2008) are concerned with. It is important to
point out that this argument is only made for instances where only one set of non-compliers exists:
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Misassignment in gure 1.7 may also be attributable to miscalculated design
values. The design values may be miscalculated for two reasons: 1) the number
of days a monitor is operable is aected by unrecoverable information, directly
impacting which one hour maximum is used (details in Appendix A) and 2) most
1990 design value were calculated from 1987 - 1989 emissions data but, without
indication, some were calculated from data recorded over 1998 - 1990. Unfortunately,
it is not possible to correct our design values as the EPA does not provide yearly
design values. Both instances of miscalculation could result in our design values
being either larger or smaller than the actual design values, thus it is not clear what
the impact is on the estimates.
Because gure 1.7 implies that the 1990 CAAA assignment rule is followed,
we use an RD design to estimate the eect of increased regulation on the change
in pollution over time. The RD design is used around the ve discrete changes in
non-attainment status of the 1990 CAAA, also known as the discontinuity points:
0.121, 0.138, 0.16, 0.18 and 0.28. The ve comparisons are between "bordering"
categories: Attainment and Marginal, Marginal and Moderate, Moderate and Se-
rious, Serious and Severe and Severe and Extreme. An RD design identies what
is known as the "average treatment eect" (ATE): E(y1 - y0), where y1 generically
indicates the pollution change for an area that has received stricter regulation, or
the "treatment", and y0 indicates the pollution change for a "control" area receiv-
ing the less strict regulation. However, one important caveat is that RD estimates
eligible observations that are not treated (looking at the case of treated ineligible observations
results in covariates controlling for the opposite selection bias).
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are only applicable around each point of discontinuity, unless the treatment eect
is assumed homogenous with respect to the design value, because a restricted sam-
ple near each point of discontinuity is used. Thus, the estimates may not be used
with any certainty to extrapolate on the ATE away from the discontinuity points
and direct comparisons may only be made between non-attainment categories which
share a point of discontinuity. Because of this limitation of using an RD design, RD
estimates are referred to as local average treatment eect (LATE).45
1.7 Estimation
The general RD estimate (fuzzy or sharp) is most simply represented as:
δ̂RD =

























and M denotes the subsample of observations satisfying v ∗NA −bw < vm, a <
v ∗NA +bw, where bw>0 is the chosen bandwidth, v∗NA is the discontinuity point
above which the area should have been assigned to the non-attainment category NA,
and DNAm,a is a dummy variable indicating the monitor m in area a was classied NA.
Finally, wi is the weight dened by an indicator function distinguishing which side
of the discontinuity each observation is on, within the subsample: wi ≡ 1(v∗NA <
45See Appendix A for furhter discussion of Regression Discontinuity.
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vm,a < v ∗NA +bw). If the assignment were strict, a sharp RD design would be
used and the denominator of 1.1 would be equal to 1. Otherwise, the denominator
is a measure of whether an observation is likely to be assigned to NA given that
v∗NA < vm,a.
Estimation by 1.1 places equal weight on observations within the subsample
by using uniform kernel weights. However, using uniform kernel weights results in
a larger bias for boundary point estimates than other kernel weights (Imbens and
Lemieux (2008)). Thus, we also use other kernel weights in the following two local
polynomial models (LPMs) to estimate δRD:
(α̂, β̂α) = argmin
α,β
∑n








βLHS,αj (vi − v∗NA)j − αwi)2 · kh(vi − v∗NA) (1.3)















βLHS,γj (vi − v∗NA)j − γwi)2 · kh(vi − v∗NA) (1.4)
where n is the total number of observations in the two non-attainment cate-








is the kernel function with bandwidth h, and the remain-
ing variables are as dened above.46 The RD estimate is then estimated as a ratio
of the estimates of α and γ: δ̂ = α̂
γ̂
46Estimation was done in Stata and coding was helped considerably by working from code made
available by professor Doug Miller's at U.C. Davis. The same bandwidth was used for both 1.3
and 1.4.
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The cross-validation measure suggested in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) is used
to select the bandwidth, h, for the above semi-parametric estimation.47 The band-
widths result with observations of between 5 and 127, for the various estimations
due to the multiple non-attainment category groupings and outcome variables. In
order to increase the number of observations, a two stage least squares estimate in
which w is used as the instrument for D will also be used.
An RD estimate δ̂RD evaluated with a uniform kernel is numerically equivalent
to a two stage estimate.48 This equivalence is pointed out most recently by Imbens
and Lemiuex (2008) who discuss how the bandwidth may be increased to include
additional observations in order to strengthen the estimates as well as allow for the
inclusion of covariates to reduce some bias. The priority in introducing covariates
should be to reduce any existing bias and increase eciency.49 Secondary are the
other benets of increasing the number of observation by increasing the bandwidth.
Increasing the bandwidth and including covariates but estimating under the frame-
work of two stage least squares generates equivalent estimates to δ̂RD so long as
covariates are relatively balanced close to the discontinuity points. Thus, condi-
tional on the covariates being somewhat balanced, we introduce covariates in order
to increase the number of observations by estimating δ̂RD,TSLS through two stage
47Each discontinuity point has a bandwidth estimate but only one bandwidth is used for both
sides of each discontinuity as well as each estimate: α and γ.
48As rst pointed out by Hahn et al. (2001), w does not have to be an exogenous instrument
so long as the main assumption of RD holds (continuity of treatment) and the bandwidth is
adjusted to create an exogenous situation. In other words, the bandwidth and w work jointly as
an instrument to create a random event.
49An additional benet from using two-stage least squares is avoiding the "curse of dimension-
ality" that arises quickly when using local-polynomial modeling. Essentially, the estimation would
need to compare and weight over a number of "dimensions" i.e. covariates.
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w wi + β
RHS,TSLSwi(vi − v∗NA)
+βLHS,TSLS(1− wi)(vi − v∗NA) + βTSLSx xi + ηi (1.6)
where xi is a vector of exogenous covariates thought to inuence pollution levels,
and εi and δi are normally distributed error terms and E(εiηi) = 0.
1.8 ResultsBalance
One measure of the strength of an RD estimate is how closely the RD design
resembles an experiment in its construction. This is measured by the balance of
the other variables across the treatment groups which may inuence the outcome of
interest, or any possible selection into the program. Table 1.1 displays 1990 census
descriptive statistics by attainment category for areas and counties, or counties made
partial due to EPA area boundaries not following county lines.50 The dierences in
demographics between areas of better and worse non-attainment categories are as
one may expect when comparing large urban areas to smaller urban and rural areas.
50The sample is restricted to areas and counties reporting design values in 1990 and 1996. County
demographics do not match area demographics because not all counties within every area report
design values in those years.
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The Hispanic and Black race demographic increases as ozone quality deteriorates in
table 1.1, changing quite a bit for the Extreme area (the South Coast Air Quality
Management District). Longer commute times and use of public transpiration,
including rail which is included separately due to its lower pollution, as well as a
slight shift towards a younger age demographic and a larger incomes and housing
values also reect the similarities of urban demographics and those for areas of high
ozone levels. Of the 4 industries included (non-durable and durable manufacturing,
agriculture and mining), the one noticeable dierence is that there is a proportionally
much larger percentage of employment in mining in attainment areas, although this
typies a rural non-polluting area.
Looking at table 1.1, it is hard to argue that the average demographic statistics
are well balanced across non-attainment categories. However, the RD design limits
observations within each attainment category to a bandwidth so it is important to
also evaluate balance within that bandwidth. For simplicity, a bandwidth of 0.01
parts per million (ppm) is used for the results presented in tables 1.2a and 1.2b
which show the demographic comparisons at the county and partial county level.
The county/partial county level of observation is used as it is more disaggregated
and more likely to be unbalanced than the area level. The two tables consist of
ve comparison groups, each group with four columns. Four columns are necessary
because the assignment process did not result in a strict regression discontinuity
design, as made evident in gures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. For those observations that are
on the incorrect side of the discontinuity, such as attainment counties above 0.121
ppm, the results are shaded grey in the two tables.
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Table 1.2a: County or Partial County Demographics within 0.01 ppm of Disconti-
nuity (1990 Census)
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Table 1.2b: County or Partial County Demographics within 0.01 ppm of Disconti-
nuity (1990 Census)
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Similarly to the results of table 1.1, tables 1.2a and 1.2b do not provide strong
evidence that the RD design balances the descriptive statistics as well as a ran-
dom experiment. Some of the larger discrepancies are highlighted in tables 1.2a
and 1.2b. The two tables do provide some insights into which demographics may
have a relationship to pollution. For instance, four statistics on the incorrect side
of the discontinuity have been outlined to point out the dierence in demographic
make-up from those counties in the same non-attainment area on correct side of the
discontinuity. Picking one in particular, the 9 Serious (SR) non-attainment counties
above the 0.160 ppm discontinuity point are 24% black on average while the 12 SR
non-attainment counties below .160 ppm are only 13% black. This result provides
a somewhat interesting anecdote that areas incorrectly marked as Serious have a
smaller black population than those with an actual ozone level that would result in
Serious. This suggests that segregated migration away from more polluted areas or
pollution targeting of blacks may exist. Further, comparing these percentages with
the 0.95% black population in the Moderate counties above the 0.160 cuto, lends
some support to the suggestion that assignment was based on the percentage make
up of black residents, suggesting that a control for race may be necessary.
Tables 1.1, 1.2a and 1.2b also display the diminishing sample size as failure of
attainment worsens. The sample size also reduces as the level of observations ex-
pands, moving from monitor to county to area. This aects the estimates presented
below, especially the lack of estimates for the Extreme discontinuity point due to
no Serious observations within the appropriate bandwidth.
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1.9 Results - Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Estimates are presented in this section for the percentage change in design
value for three levels of observation: area, county or partial county, and monitor,
across two dierent time periods: 1990 through the rst milestone in 1996, yMNA, and
1990 through each non-attainment category's attainment deadline, yDNA. As can be
seen from table 1.3, although there is a lot of variation across the estimates, all but
six of the results are insignicantly dierent from zero at a reasonable condence
level. The variation in estimates that exists across the three dierent levels of
observation does suggest that the level of observation needs to be chosen carefully,
but the insignicance and overall noise in the estimates implies that the situation
may not have been ideal for the chosen RD estimation procedure.
The main columns of table 1.3 are broken out by the two time periods, with the
6 year milestone time period consisting of the left six columns and the time adjusted
results in the right six columns. The time periods are then broken down into columns
of results which use a uniform and Epanechnikov kernels, and those, in-turn, consist
of columns for results by observation level: area, county and then monitor.51The
rows are broken out by the non-attainment comparison groups, Attainment and
Marginal through Serious and Severe moving downwards. Unfortunately, identi-
cation involving the Extreme category is not possible due to the limited number of
observations.
The RD estimates in table 1.3 are interpreted similarly to a dierence-in-
51A uniform kernel assigns equal weight to each observation while a Epanechnikov kernel assigns
a weight of: K(x) = 34 (1− x
2) where K(x) is dened as above in (10).
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Table 1.3: Regression Discontinuity Results: Percentage change in DV from 1990 to
1996 and Time Adjusted
42
dierences estimate. Each estimate is the percentage dierence (in decimals) of the
dierences in emissions over the 1990 and 1996 period, or over the non-attainment
deadline adjusted time-period, between the relevant non-attainment categories. Un-
der the assumptions for the RD design, it is assumed that any other impacts on the
change in emissions other than the regulation of the non-attainment categories of
each group are dierenced out. For example, although insignicant, the Attainment
and Marginal RD estimate for the county level change over the 1990 to 1996 pe-
riod implies that the regulation of the Marginal non-attainment category, relative to
the regulation of the Attainment category, may have resulted in an additional 26%
drop in the design value measurement using a uniform kernel versus a 29% drop in
emissions using an Epanechnikov kernel.52 This estimate of the change in the de-
sign values comes from a restricted subsample of Attainment category observations
within a bandwidth of 0.015 ppm and 0.005 ppm of 0.121 ppm, respectively.
There are some unexpected estimates in table 1.3, such as those that are well
above a 100% change. The source of this issue appears to be the denominator es-
timate, which, from (9) above, represents the probability of being in the treatment
group conditional on being above the discontinuity point. In addition to the de-
nominator estimate at times being very small, inating the RD estimate greatly, it
is in two instances well above 1 and occasionally surprisingly negative, causing a
reversal in the impact given by the numerator (for instance, suggesting a relative
increase rather than a relative decline). These issues are due to the non-strict as-
signment, the use of a linear probability model and, most likely, the small number of
52Standard errors were calculated according to Porter (2003).
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observations. The dierence in the number of observations across estimates is due
to the dierence in bandwidths which are also given in the tables. The minimum
of the numerator and denominator bandwidths was used each estimate and each
bandwidth was calculated according to the cross-validation measure suggested by
Imbens and Lemieux (2008), as mentioned above.
The numerator estimates in tables 1.3 provide an understanding of how the
estimates vary according to which observation level is used, although this is under
the caveat that they are not corrected for treatment selection. Across the monitor,
county and area level, the estimates dier in magnitude and sign within each non-
attainment group and time period. This implies that careful consideration of the
level of observation needs to be taken into account when deciding what question is
being asked as the answers may be quite dierent. However, considering the issues
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it is dicult to draw much inference from
the estimates in table 1.3. As discussed above, in order to address the concern that
sample size may be an issue we introduce covariates in order to increase the number
of observations by estimating δ̂RD,TSLS through two stage least squares.
1.10 Results - Two Stage Least Squares
The results from estimating two-stage least squares regressions, equations 1.5
and 1.6, are presented in tables 1.4a and 1.4b. Table 1.4a presents the results for
the dierences in emissions over the 1990 and 1996 period, while table 1.4b is for
the non-attainment deadline adjusted time-period. There are ten pairs of columns
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Table 1.4a: Two-Stage Least Squares: Percentage change in DV from 1990 to 1996
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Table 1.4b: Two-Stage Least Squares: Percentage change in DV from 1990 to 1996
46
in each table though two pairs in table 1.4b are not estimated. Each pair reports
estimates for the impact of a dierent non-attainment category's discontinuity point,
with the left column of each pair reporting a base regression without covariates,
and the right column including covariates from the 1990 census. For example, left
columns under Marginal NA, measure the impact of the marginal designation by
looking at the 0.121 ppm cuto. The rst ve pairs are estimates at the monitor
level and the second ve pairs ares estimates at the county and partial county level.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to estimate the area level do to sample size issues.
The main coecient of interest is "Non-Attainment (NA)" which is equivalent
to an RD estimate from a uniform kernel RD design without a specied bandwidth.
With the exception of a very peculiar result for the Severe Non-Attainment category,
one Extreme category result that is due to collinearity from missing census data,
and very large (100%) declines for the Extreme category, the impact of the non-
attainment categories are reasonable though mainly insignicant with percentage
changes in design values between 1990 and 1996 ranging from an increase of 4% for
the Marginal non-attainment category to a decrease of 38% for the Severe category,
and percentage declines in design values for the relevant deadlines between 9% for
the Moderate category and a 48% for the Severe category. With the exception of
the impact of the Marginal category, the estimates suggest that the non-attainment
categories have had a substantial impact on design values which appears to increase
with increased regulation. As expected, the results do change by the level of analysis
and outcome variable.
There is no clear indication of whether the impacts increase or decrease when
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the level of analysis changes from the percentage change between 1990 and 1996 to
the timeline adjusted measure. The estimates suggest that the Moderate category
results in a lower decline when the design values at the deadlines are considered.
This result is surprising as the deadline for the Moderate and Marginal categories
are six and three years respectively. Thus, the result implies that the impact of
Marginal category was slightly larger at the time of the Moderate category's dead-
line. However, for the other categories such as the Severe category, the impact is
larger for the deadline adjusted outcome measure which is somewhat intuitive as
the timeline measure compares monitors and counties with more time to reduce
emissions to those with less time. Because the specication estimated is designed to
compare design values around the same starting point, with the same goal of 0.121
ppm but with dierent deadlines, this result implies that monitors and counties
with design values on the "high-end" of their category range were not making their
deadlines. For the Serious category, the change depends on whether the monitor or
county level observation is used, pointing again to the importance of the observation
level.
The dierence in estimates based on the level of observation is once again
found in the two-stage least squares analysis. Although the dierence in estimates
are often not as large as that found in the local-polynomial RD estimates, the impact
of the Serious category is attenuated to a large degree when using the County level
analysis rather than the Monitor level. The estimates of the impact of the Serious
category on the percentage change from 1990 to 1996 drop from a 21-24% decline for
the Monitor level analysis to a 7-13% decline for the County level. The dierences
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provide more evidence that the observation level needs to be carefully considered
when discussing outcomes relative to the CAA.
The additional covariates used in the regression come from the 1990 Census
and are measured at the tract level for the monitor or the appropriate county or area
level for the respective observation level. The measures included are: the percentage
of households commuting in a private vehicle, commuting by public transportation,
with a commute time of 20 to 60 minutes, with a commute time greater than 60 min-
utes, employed in the non-durable manufacturing industry, employed in the durable
manufacturing industry, employed in the agricultural industry, employed in the min-
ing industry, percentage of races: Hispanic, Black, Asian and American Indian and
housing values below $50,000, between $50,000-$100,000 and between $100,000 and
$250,000. The employment covariates and the covariates of increased travel time are
included as observation specic attributes which cause higher ozone levels prior to
assignment and thus could be targeted by regulations. Additionally, covariates such
as race were included based on the balance results reported in tables 1.2a and 1.2b.
There is no uniform pattern in the coecients which result and the covariates do not
appear to have a great impact on the RD estimate with the exception of producing
a much larger impact on the 1996 deadline outcome in the Extreme category.
1.11 Conclusion
The severity of the ozone problem has been characterized by the EPA as:
"the most widespread and persistent urban pollution problem," emphasizing the
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importance of determining a way to reduce emissions.53 The EPA amended the
CAA in 1990 in an attempt to bring about a reduction in ozone after many failed
prior deadlines. This paper used the assignment rule from the change in regulations
to consider the impact of the dierent levels of regulations as well as the dier-
ent deadlines imposed through the amendment. Overall, the results were mainly
insignicant, although the estimates do suggest that dierences in regulation have
had an impact on the decline in ozone. The insignicance of the results may be
due to the non-strict assignment of the non-attainment status which is addressed
to some degree by including control variables and additional observations through
larger bandwidths using a two-stage least squares RD approach.
This paper demonstrates that the CAA may be analyzed using RD method-
ology under the correct observation level. By analyzing the data at dierent ob-
servation levels the extent that the results depend on the level of observation used
becomes clear. Prior papers have used monitor and county levels for analysis when
neither may have been correct. Although using the area level of assignment greatly
limits results by severely limiting sample size, without accounting for the correct
level of regulation assignment, it would be possible to choose the level according
to the results to suit the questions. This result implies that future work should be
careful to detail the correct level of regulation assumed in any analysis.
53Overview of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA)
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Chapter 2
How Many Economists does it take to Change a Light Bulb? A
Natural Field Experiment on Technology Adoption1
2.1 Introduction
The slow adoption and diusion of energy-ecient and thus, cost-saving, tech-
nologies, has been referred to in previous literature as an energy paradox (e.g. Jae
and Stavins (1994)). While much of this previous research has focused on positive
analysis, the importance of exploring the energy paradox goes beyond eorts to
uncover explanations for the slow diusion of such technologies. There is also need
for normative studies that set forth to identify actions that motivate adoption and
achieve the economic and social benets of reduced energy consumption. This pa-
per focuses on this latter consideration by placing its focus on the factors which
impact residential adoption of environmental technologies. This is done by utiliz-
ing a theoretical model to inform the design of a large scale door-to-door natural
eld experiment on technology adoption. The eld experiment took place in the
suburbs of Chicago, IL, and consisted of directly approaching households to oer
compact uorescent light bulbs (CFLs) for purchase under varying prices, frames,
and warning notices placed at households the day prior to soliciting. To date, 8,815
1This is joint research with Professor John List of the University of Chicago and Assistant
Professor Michael Price of The University of Tennessee
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households were approached, and 32% of those households answered their doors.
This paper is motivated by the potential for reducing energy consumption
through technology adoption in residential houses. We consider CFLs in this pa-
per because the rate of CFL adoption and diusion throughout the United States
satises the two primary conditions for a technology suering from the energy para-
dox: the technology has not been fully adopted and suers a slow rate of diusion,
and CFLs are a cost-saving technology that is rationale to purchase from a price
stand-point.2 This lack of diusion is costing the environment and the economy
through pollution and energy costs because CFLs are roughly 75% more ecient
in energy use than traditional incandescent light bulbs. A common considered cal-
culation is that replacing one incandescent in every household in the U.S. with a
CFL would prevent the equivalent annual greenhouse gas emissions of 420,000 cars
and reduce energy expenditure by $806 million. Although CFLs are the focus of
this paper, the results from the eld experiment could be used to inform adoption
of other environmental technologies, such as low ow shower heads or technology
involved with energy smart grids. There are a number of other technologies which
can be considered in the residential sector, creating a great opportunity to approach
President Obama's goal of reducing greenhouse gas pollution by 28% by 2020 be-
cause the housing sector accounts for 21% of gas emissions (U.S. Energy Information
Administration).
The theoretical model presented in this paper is adapted from theory developed
2The Department of Energy's CFL Market Prole released in March, 2009, found that only
11% of the light sockets feasible for CFLs in U.S. households were being used by CFLs, although
70% of U.S. households did have at least one CFL.
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for door-to-door charitable solicitations in Della Vigna, List, and Malmendier (2009).
This theory extends naturally to a consumer's decision to purchase and adopt an
environmental technology from a door-to-door solicitor. The theory informs the
design of the eld experiment so that the underlying social pressure and attitudes
towards CFLs can be discussed. This is done by including treatments which allow
households to select out the salesperson interaction. Selection occurs due to door-
hanger warning notices placed on the household's door a day prior to a salesperson's
visit. In addition to a control group that does not receive a warning, some households
are warned and some are warned with a notice that allows them to check a box
signifying that they do not want to be disturbed. The results from these warning
treatments are suggestive that social pressure exists, with a 10% and 28% decline in
answer rate when the households are warned and warned with option of not being
disturbed, respectively.
For the households that do answer the door, our natural eld experiment in-
cludes treatments aimed at assessing factors stemming from economic theory as well
as theories found in social-psychology. The impact of economic costs on technology
adoption is considered by including treatments which vary the price of the environ-
mental technology oered for purchase. The inuence of social-psychology factors
are assessed through treatments which vary a social norm statement in the exper-
imental script, varying the level of social pressure imposed on the household. We
focus on the impact of social norms due to recent research which suggests that so-
cial norms have a strong impact on behavior related to environmental conservation
while research on other psychological inuences, such as the Foot-In-The-Door
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technique, is less conclusive (e.g. Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius (2008) and
Cialdini and Goldstein (2004)).
By including treatments motivated by both economic and social-psychology
disciplines in the same eld experiment, we create as close to an apples-to-apples
comparison of what the disciplines would suggest motivate adoption as possible.
The results indicate that both price and social pressure through a social norm state-
ment have signicant impacts on the decision to purchase environmental technol-
ogy. However, price and social pressure motivate purchase on two dierent margins.
Whereas social pressure has greater inuence along the extensive margin by encour-
aging households to purchase one package of CFLs, reductions in price work along
the intensive margin by encouraging the purchase of more than one package. These
results are intuitive and informative when considering methods of adoption encour-
agement in the future. Further, by incorporating treatments with both price and
social norms we are able to estimate a monetary value for using social norms to
encourage adoption. This price for social norms is substantial, with the demand
adjustments due to the social norm statements equivalent to between a 30% and
70% price reduction.
A secondary interest of this research is to use surveys conducted during the eld
experiment to identify issues remaining as barriers to the adoption of CFLs. Previous
research separates the barriers to adoption into three main areas: the initial high cost
of CFLs, consumer preferences for the lighting abilities of incandescent light bulbs,
and their incompatibility with existing lighting infrastructure (Lefevre, T'Serclaes,
and Waide (2006) and Reynolds, DeSisto, Murray, and Kolodinksy (2007)). The
54
eld experiment we conducted was ideally situated to inform this discussion. Beyond
simply providing an indication of what improvements need to be made to increase the
amount of CFLs adopted, combining survey responses on the decision to purchase
or not to purchase CFLs with the price variation in the treatments allows some
indication of what may be causing the presumed energy paradox. In brief, the survey
results suggest that quality and the ability to dispose are of greatest concern.
The next section of this paper places our research in the existing literature.
The paper continues by developing the theoretical model and empirical approach.
This is followed by a discussion of the experimental design, its implementation and
the results (again, this is an early draft so more results to follow). As a preview, our
results suggest that price and social norms have a substantial impact on the decision
to adopt but that they work through dierent channels. Finally, we conclude with
a brief statement.
2.2 Previous Literature
The discussion surrounding Griliches' 1957 economic analysis of hybrid corn
provides an early demonstration of how economists have traditionally considered
prot as the motivation for adopting new technologies while other academic elds
have focused elsewhere (see Skinner and Stiger (2005) for a recent addition to the
discussion). Although price remains a consideration, economists have broadened
their focus to understand aspects of technology adoption beyond prot motives as
discussed in Hall (2004). Recent papers have considered how information aects
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adoption (Duo, Kremer, and Robinson (2004)) and how that information ows
through societies or social networks in various settings (Bandiera and Rasul (2006),
Conley and Udry (2010), and Oster and Thornton (2010)). This paper continues
to broaden the considerations of technology adoption by economists by directly
comparing prices and social norms in the same eld experiment.
Recent work on residential energy conservation has used non-pecuniary tech-
niques adopted from research by social-psychologists such as the various forms of
personal persuasion reviewed in Cialdini (1993). This work has generally focused
on changing energy usage behavior rather than specically encouraging adoption
of energy ecient products, such as in Schultz et al. (2007), Allcott (2009) and
Ferraro and Price (2010). These papers utilize social norms by reporting a house-
hold's energy use relative to the average energy use of households on its energy
bill. This technique has led to average declines in monthly energy use that range
from 2 - 3% but have been as large as 5.28%, 6%, and 8.3% for high energy con-
suming households in Ferraro and Price (2010), Allcott (2009), and Schultz et al.
(2007) respectively.3 This paper is directly related to this recent work but focuses
on changing behavior to motivate adoption of a specic technology in order to avoid
the potential boomerang eect or other mean reversions after the experiment.4
3One benet of focusing on encouraging adoption rather than a behavior change is the removal
of a return to the normative behavior or a boomerang eect (e.g. Shultz et al. (2007) and Allcott
(2009)). However, this is not certain as the eect may still exist through using more electricity
(such as to compensate for the poor quality of light).
4It is important to note that we do not have data on energy usage at the household level so
cannot be certain that mean reversion or some behavior response similar to the boomerang eect
is not occurring. However, we did conduct follow up surveys with a number of households that
purchased CFLs from our sales-persons. The follow up surveys consisrted of rst oering the
households $5 or an additional package of 4 CFLs if they could show us a CFL purchased from us
that is currently being used. We were able to contact 141 households in the follow-up and of those
141, only 3 were not using CFLs while 134 wanted the free pack of CFLs. Thus, the follow-up
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The impact of social norms on conservation behavior was further demonstrated
in Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius (2008), which varied the level of social
pressure of hotel guests by stating that previous guests in the hotel or hotel
room had reused bathroom towels over the course of their stay. This small change
in social pressure from announcing the results relative to guests in the hotel to results
relative to guests in the hotel room, resulted in an increase of towel reuse of 49.3%.
In line with the recent behavioral economic approaches towards energy conservation
and the ndings involving social norms, the eld experiment implemented for this
paper incorporated social norms in order to consider a social-psychology approach to
technology adoption.5 As discussed below, varying the social norms due to proximity
were easily adjusted for the technology adoption case considered here.
For energy ecient or environmental technologies, previous economic research
has found that the upfront cost of technology has a larger impact on adopting en-
ergy saving technologies than the marginal cost of energy. The larger impact of
adoption costs is often shown for corporations, such as in Anderson and Newell
(2004) which discussed the large impact on the adoption of energy ecient technol-
ogy at manufacturing plants by using data from responses to energy audits oered
by the Department of Energy's Industrial Assessment Centers program (see also
Soderholm and Klaasen (2007) and Otto and Reilly (2008)). However, the upfront
cost has also been found to be very burdensome for residential households, for ex-
results are highly suggestive that many households are using the CFLs.
5Other commitment and consistency techniques were considered, such as the foot-in-the-door
technique, but inconsistent results reviewed in Burger (1999), Guadagno, Asher, Demaine, &
Cialdini, (2001) and Cialdini and Goldstein (2004), as well as a discussion with Noah Goldstein
armed our focus on social norms.
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ample Jae and Stavins (1995) contains a theoretical model of technology adoption
which, after estimating the model for residential homes using survey data from the
National Association of Home Builders, found that technology costs have an impact
on adoption that is three times larger than that for energy prices.
This previous research suggests that subsidizing the upfront cost of technology
adoption may be the strongest tool in the economic toolbox to encourage adoption.
Additionally, subsidies provide a reasonably approachable market-based technique
to administer in a natural eld experiment. Although market-based environmen-
tal policies have been on the minds of economists since Pigou's seminal work on
welfare in 1912, subsidizing new environmental technologies to encourage adoption
stands as a somewhat controversial approach under standard economic assumptions
of informed rational agents and perfect capital markets. This paper does not take
a stand on market imperfections or what explains subsidizing new technology as
economically rational.6 Rather, we consider the impact that it may have on adop-
tion rates and thus consider the impact of subsidizing a new technology.7 Thus, we
included price treatments as an economic approach to adoption.
There have been a number of other research papers discussing eorts to pro-
mote energy ecient behavior and the adoption CFLs more specically. However,
these eorts have not been designed as treatments to uncover the impact of various
methods of encouragement but instead have typically considered CFL adoption poli-
6One justication for considering motivation of technology adoption is that pollution continues
to not be fully priced in to the market. Therefore, society is still facing a cost that markets have
not born and a subsidy could provide a way to lessen this externality.
7For a discussion of subsidizing new technologies and a broad overview of technology adoption
see Jae, Newell, and Stavins (2002).
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cies and programs that had already occurred (Martinot and Borg (1998); Lefevre, et
al. (2006)). This lack of experimental implementation resulted in these studies pri-
marily discussing barriers to adoption for CFLs through survey results. The previous
research has found that various barriers to CFL adoption exist, such as cost and
quality as well as a lack of information and desire to change behavior, but has left
many interesting questions unanswered (e.g. Lefevre, et al. (2006) and Reynolds,
DeSisto, Murray, and Kolodinksy (2007)). Further, a broad review of the existing
literature on energy conservation eorts, Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, and Rothengatter
(2005), points out that these programs predominately promote adjusting behavior
rather than adopting new technologies.
The research discussed in this paper utilizes a carefully designed natural eld
experiment on technology adoption (see Harrison and List (2004) for a general dis-
cussion of eld experiments). Thus, our paper diers from previous work on CFL
adoption in two ways: 1) a clearly designed experiment and 2) a focus on technolo-
gies, rather than behaviors. Our focus on technologies rather than behaviors is also
a step away from recent research on energy conservation more broadly (Schultz et
al. (2007), Allcott (2009) and Ferraro and Price (2010)). This focus is intentional
as these reductions are permanent as opposed to alterations in behavior, which have
been shown to go away without incentives in the case of changes in smoking and
weight loss behavior (e.g. Jerey and Wing (1995), Donatelle, et al. (2004), Volpp,
et al. (2006) and Volpp, et al. (2008)). The design of the natural eld experiment
and the incorporation of the variation in prices and statements of social norms are
informed by a theoretical model which is discussed next.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Theory: Discrete Choice Model of Adoption with Social Pressure
and Attitude
The theoretical model derived in this section is based on Della Vigna, List, and
Malmendier (2009) (DLM). The theoretical model developed in DLM motivates a
natural eld experiment on door-to-door charitable solicitation. This theory extends
naturally to the consumer's decision to purchase an environmental technology from
a door-to-door solicitor and informs experimental treatments discussed more fully
in the next section. The theory developed here for technology adoption diers from
DLM in two fundamental aspects: rst, social pressure in the model presented
below is based on a dichotomous decision of whether to purchase or not, rather than
a function of how much to donate, and second, price is included for the consumable
good of interest. These dierences allow for the inclusion of experimental treatments
that vary in price as well as social pressure, which provide greater understanding of
adoption by allowing comparison of both monetary and non-monetary motivations.
The consumer's purchase decision is modeled in two stages: the rst stage is
the decision of whether or not to be home and the second stage is the decision
to purchase from a door-to-door salesperson selling CFLs, conditional on being
home and answering the door. We begin discussing the model with the second
stage. When deciding whether to purchase CFLs, labeled here q, households face
the following utility function:
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U(q) = u(W − pq) + av(q,Q−i)− s(q) (2.1)
where s(q) = S(ρ) · 1q=0 (a social pressure function)
and
W ≡ wealth
a ≡ attitude toward private and public benets of purchase
q ≡ quantity of CFLs purchased at price p
Q−i ≡ quantity of CFLs purchased by all other households
ρ ≡ proximity of adoption rate
S(ρ) ≡ measure of the level of social pressure.
The model of the purchase decision has three components: a direct impact through
the expenditures aect on overall wealth, an indirect impact that is a combination
of the private and public benets of the purchase, and a social impact due to making
the decision to purchase in front of someone else.
The rst and last components of the purchase model are similar to the addi-
tively separable version of the model discussed in Levitt and List (2007), in which
both wealth and moral factors are considered in the utility function. In the model
discussed here, the decision to purchase aects overall wealth but has some moral
implications due to social pressure. The second component of the model reects
the consumer's attitude towards CFLs. This attitude is formed from both the pri-
vate consumption of the good and from the good's contribution to the public good
through its environmental attributes. This combination of private and public char-
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acteristics in a good for private consumption has recently been more completely
discussed and explored in Kotchen (2006). We do not attempt to parse the private
and public attributes in this model or the experiment discussed below.
The rst component of the model is the direct utility for the consumer from
overall wealth, u(W − pq), and is aected by the decision to purchase the new
technology at price p through a reduction of wealth to be spent on other goods,
represented here by W. The direct utility is assumed to be a standard strictly
increasing concave utility function and thus: u′() > 0 and u′′() ≤ 0. The purchase
also aects the second component of the model, indirect utility, av(q,Q−i), through
the private and public attributes of CFLs. The parameter a, captures the consumer
attitude toward the private and public attributes and the attitude may be nega-
tive. For example, the quality issues reported in earlier research indicate that many
consumers may have strong negative attitudes towards private consumption. It is
possible that these could well outweigh any possible positive attributes through al-
truistic interests (both pure and impure) resulting from the green technology. This
public good is the same as discussed in the charitable literature but is focused here
on the environment so that the total contributions to the public good in our model
is the summation of the CFL purchases of all individuals: Q = Q−i + q.
8
Consumers with a positive a are assumed to exhibit overall positive attitudes
towards the private and public attributes of CFLs, and the reverse for consumers
8This ignores monetary donations to the public good, inclusion of which would consider how the
non-1-to-1 conversion for CFL to public good versus other forms of contributions aects purchase
decisions (see Kotchen 2006 for a theoretical discussion). However, since contributing to a public
good through donations is also not 1-to-1, our current approach ts into the majority of the existing
literature.
62
with a negative a. The direct utility function is assumed to be either concave or
convex depending on a. If a > 0 the indirect utility function is assumed to be
concave, vq(q,Q−i) > 0 and vqq(q,Q−i) ≤ 0, while if a < 0 it is assumed to be
convex, vq(q,Q−i) > 0 and vqq(q,Q−i) ≥ 0. This change in concavity follows the
intuition of how the purchase impacts utility. If there is a distaste for CFLs then
a < 0 and the convexity assumption assures that there is a diminishing marginal
impact of further purchases as there is when a > 0 and v(q,Q−i) is concave.
The nal term of the utility function, s(q), captures the impact of social pres-
sure that the consumer experiences by being approached in person by a door-to-door
salesperson. For the eld experiment discussed next, the level of social pressure,
S(ρ), is a function of the level of the social norm stated by the salesperson in terms
of the proximity of the adopters to the consumer,ρ. The proximity of the social
norm was varied in the eld experiment by using or omitting the following state-
ments: 70% of the households that were surveyed in the U.S. owned at least one
CFL and 70% of the households that we surveyed in this area owned at least one
CFL.9 The social pressure function also includes an indicator function that is equal
to one when a consumer purchases a package of CFLs, 1q=1. This is the correct
specication in terms of the stated social norm, but it is important to note that
this specication carries with it the underlying assumption that consumers are only
aected by social pressure if they do not purchase any of the new technology. That
is, the social pressure results in our theory and experiment are suggestive of the
9The adoption rate was generated by surveying households in a two week pilot study. We were
extremely fortunate to have the same adoption rate as the rest of the nation from this pilot study as
the adoption rate from our later surveys is indeed higher. In our experiment, ρ varies by treatment
between national and area.
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decision of whether or not to purchase, not how much to purchase.
The solution for the level of quantity purchased in equation 2.1, q∗, is a func-
tion of attitude a, price p and social pressure S(ρ), but can be characterized by
attitude thresholds. These can be compared to the attitude thresholds in DLM
and, as shown in that paper, these thresholds lead to an intuitive discussion of the
results. The thresholds for attitude are:
a(p, S(ρ)) ≡ u(W )−u(W−p)−S(ρ)
v(1,Q−i)−v(0,Q−i) (indierent between buying 0 and 1)
ā(p, S(ρ)) ≡ u(W−p)−u(W−2p)
v(2,Q−i)−v(1,Q−i) (indierent between buying 1 and 2)
The attitude threshold for purchasing increases with the amount purchased, or a <
a, and the threshold is inversely related to the gain in marginal indirect utility.
Intuitively, a larger marginal gain from increasing consumption reduces the threshold
at which consumption occurs but thresholds do remain in order with respect to the
amount purchased. Then, using these thresholds, for xed p = p1 and S(ρ) = S1
and any attitude type a, there is a unique optimal purchase amount q∗(a, p1, S1)
which is weakly increasing in a:10
(i) q∗(a, p1, S1) = 0 for a ≤ a(p1, S1)
(ii) q∗(a, p1, S1)) = 1 for a(p1, S1) < a < ā(p1, S1)
(iii) q∗(a, p1, S1) ≥ 2 for ā(p1, S1) ≤ a.
As expected from the intuition of the thresholds, for a given level of social pressure
and price, consumers of higher attitude type decide to purchase or purchase more
10Simplifying assumptions were made when the consumer was indierent.
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CFLs. Intuitively, consumers receive positive indirect utility which interacts directly
with attitude type, so with everything else held constant, increases in attitude type
lead to increases in purchases.
Both price and social pressure are taken as constant when establishing the
attitude thresholds, but both price and social pressure have obviously important
impacts on the purchase decision and the design of our eld experiment. A change
in social norms only aects the lower attitude threshold which inuences the decision
to purchase, not how much to purchase. The change in the lower attitude threshold
with respect to social pressure is proportional to the additional indirect utility from
purchasing the rst CFL: ∂a(·)
∂S(·) =
−1
v(1,Q−i)−v(0,Q−i) . A similar impact results from a




v(1,Q−i)−v(0,Q−i) . Intuitively, an increase
in social pressure lowers the attitude threshold because consumers with lower levels
of attitude are induced into purchasing due to social pressure. Further, the larger
the impact of purchasing given by the dierence in indirect utility, the less social
pressure is a factor in the purchase decision.
Unlike a change in social pressure, a change in price impacts both the attitude
threshold indicating the decision to purchase and the threshold to purchase more





v(1,Q−i)−v(0,Q−i) . Once again the denominator is positive by as-
sumption but now the numerator depends on the slope of the direct utility which is
assumed positive everywhere. Thus, an increase in price intuitively leads to a higher
attitude threshold and similarly a decrease in price leads to a lower threshold. The
impact of price on the decision to purchase more than one CFL package has sim-
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numerator is again positive under the assumption of an increasing concave direct
utility function, resulting in a positive relationship between price and the attitude
threshold indicating a purchase of more than one package. Essentially, when price
increases, the indirect benets from adopting have to increase as well in order for a
purchase to occur.
As mentioned, the decision to purchase the new technology is modeled in two
stages, with a rst stage decision concerning a household's presence at home and
answering the door. The likelihood of someone from the household being home and
answering the door in the rst stage is represented here by h, and the household's
baseline probability of being home and answering the door is represented by h0. It
is assumed to be costly to adjust from the baseline probability, h0, and that cost
is assumed to be a convex cost function c(h). In the eld experiment discussed
next, we provide the households an ability to adjust the likelihood of being home
by placing door-hangers on their doors which announce the hour that a salesperson
will be knocking on doors, the day before the salesperson arrives (the language on
the door-hangers is discussed in the experimental design section but can be seen
in gure 2.2). This ensures that the households that we warn have an ability to
adjust the likelihood of being home because, with some probability, members of the
household see the warning and know that they will be encountering a door-to-door
salesperson.
The rst stage decision is then represented as a household solving the following
maximization decision for whether someone will be home and will answer the door,
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which incorporates the optimal purchase decision, q∗, from stage two:
max
h∈[0,1]
h[u(W − pq∗) + av(q∗, Q−i)− s(q∗)] + (1−h)[u(W )− av(0, Q−i)]− c(h) (2.2)
The decision is based on a tradeo between the utility resulting from the optimal
decision in the second stage, the utility obtained from not being home, u(W ), and
the cost of adjusting the probability of being home, c(h). The optimal solution is
characterized as follows: For any type a and xed p = p1 and S(ρ) = S1 , there is
a unique optimal probability of being at home h∗(a, p, S(ρ)) that is non-decreasing
in a.
(i) For S(ρ) > 0, there exists an a0 ≥ a such that
(a) h∗(a, p, S(ρ)) = h0 for a = a0,
(b) h∗(a, p, S(ρ)) < h0 for a < a0 and
(c) h∗(a, p, S(ρ)) > h0 for a > a0.
(ii) For S(ρ) = 0 (no social pressure),
(a) h∗(a, p, 0) = h0 for a ≤ a and
(b) h∗(a, p, 0) > h0 for a > a.
From these solutions, the decision to stay home can be understood as a function
of attitude, social pressure and price. However, it is important to note that price
and social pressure, which are experimentally varied in this research, are not known
when the household makes its decision to be home so we assume households have an
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expected level of social pressure in the absence of what is induced by our treatments.
If there is no expected social pressure, households with a suciently low taste for
CFLs (a ≤ a) are not induced to alter their behavior (h = h0) while households
with a taste above the lower threshold (a > a) adjust their probability of being
home in order to take advantage of the opportunity to purchase the new technology.
When social pressure exists (in expectation by the household) households with low
tastes for the private and public benets of CFLs take measures to avoid the door-
to-door salesperson. This decision to lower the probability of being home changes
at a0. Households with a above a but below a0, exert eort to not be home but will
purchase if found at home in order to avoid the cost of social pressure.
Figure 2.1 displays visually the decision to be home and purchase in the atti-
tude and social pressure space. The attitude thresholds are represented as discussed
above. Note that for a given positive level of social pressure, if attitude increased
for a given consumer, that consumer would at rst decrease her probability of be-
ing home for very low levels of attitude. However, above the minimum attitude
threshold, a, she would decide to purchase if at home and above a0 would take steps
to increase the probability of being home to take advantage of the opportunity to
purchase the good. This theory indicates that some consumers alter their at-home
decision because the optimal purchase decision for them is not to purchase. Thus,
when confronted with social pressure, consumers may adopt even though they are
making an otherwise utility reducing decision.
The household decision on being home or not has so far been based on the
assumption that adjusting h is costly and is characterized by the cost function c(h).
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Figure 2.1: Decision to Be Home (h) and Purchase (q)
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In our experimental design, we include a treatment which allows for the household
to opt out without cost by marking a box on the door-hanger. Figure 2.2 shows
examples of the door-hangers used in the experiment. Two warning treatments,
Warning (W) and Warning with Opt Out (OO), and one control group, No
Warning (NW), were included in ougurer experimental design. Households in
the W treatment group receive notices that state: Students will visit this address
tomorrow (date of visit) between (one hour time block) to oer for purchase and
discuss energy saving light bulb options. Households in the OO treatment receive
the same message but with an additional box located at the bottom of the notice
next to the following statement: check this box if you do not want to be disturbed.
Finally, the NW treatment group of households does not receive a notice on their
door. The option of opting-out of the solicitation allows the household to lower
their probability of being approached to zero, or in the case of our model lower the
eective probability of being home to zero (h = 0), at no cost (c(0) = 0).11 This
additional treatment provides indications of whether social pressure exists as for the
case of no social pressures, S(ρ, κ) = 0, households should never opts out for any
a while if social pressure exists, S > 0, opting out should occur for suciently low
attitude types, a < a0.
11There may be some social cost not accounted for here to publicly indicating that you do not
wish to be disturbed as the door-hangers must remain on the door with this indication marked
until the following day when one of the peddlers/solicitors visited the house.
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Figure 2.2: Door-Hanger Examples
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2.3.2 Predictions
Further assumptions are necessary to generate predictions which can be em-
pirically tested. First, we assume that consumers are heterogeneous in attitude
with a distributed with c.d.f. F . Second, following DLM, an intuitive framework
for discussing the model's predictions is through two scenarios: (1) the existence
of attitude that would encourage adoption but no social pressure, characterized by
F (a) < 1and S = 0, and (2) very limited attitude to encourage adoption and positive
social pressure, characterized by: F (a) = 1and S > 0. The assumptions underlying
these two scenarios are used to generate predictions for being home and purchasing
under the three treatments involving door-hangers, and these predictions can then
be compared theoretically and empirically.
2.3.2.1 Predicted Probability of being home
The probabilities that the adopter is at home, p(H), in the NW, W and OO
treatments are given by:
pNW (H) = h0








where r is the probability that the household sees the door-hanger and aOO =
−∞
a0
for S = 0
for S > 0
because all adopters with attitude lower than a0 that would
otherwise choose to avoid being home (h∗(·) < h0) can opt-out without cost. Under
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scenario 1 with attitude but no social pressure, the probability of being at home is
higher in both cases with door-hangers, W and OO, than it is in the case without
door-hangers, because households that want to purchase select into being home and
households that don't want to purchase do not avoid answering the door as there
is no social pressure from saying no. However, under scenario 2 with very limited
attitude and positive social pressure, the probability of being at home is highest in
the non-warned case, NW, lower for W, and lowest for OO. Or:
F (a) < 1 and S = 0→ pW (H) = pOO(H) > pNW (H)
F (a) = 1 and S > 0→ pNW (H) > pW (H) > pOO(H).
The proof for prediction this rst prediction is included in the appendix; the
intuition is straightforward. When no social pressure is present, there is no negative
no-monetary ramication from declining to purchase and, thus, no reason for house-
holds to avoid answering the door in the treatments with warning (whether W or
OO). Therefore, only the sub-sample of the population that chooses to increase the
probability of being home is aected, increasing the overall probability of encoun-
tering someone. However, when there is social pressure but limited attitude types
of a sucient level to encourage adoption, households that wish to not purchase will
choose to avoid answering the door if at all possible, leading to households that have
not been warned (NW) having higher probabilities of being found home. Further,
the households that wish to not purchase and that can opt-out without cost do so,
resulting in a lower probability for the OO treatment group.
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2.3.2.2 Predicted Probability of purchasing, unconditional on answer-
ing door
The probabilities that the household adopts unconditional of whether door is
answered, p(A), in the NW, W and OO treatments are given by:
pNW (A) = h0 · (1− F (a))




pOO(A) = (1− r)h0 · (1− F (a)) + r ·
´∞
a0
h∗(a, p, S(ρ))dF .
Under scenario 1 with attitude but no social pressure, the probability of being
at home is higher in both cases with door-hangers, W and OO, than it is in the
case without door-hangers, and the probability is the same in the case of door-
hangers. This increase in the probability of being home results in an increase in
the probability of purchasing as well. However, under scenario 2 with very limited
attitude and positive social pressure, the sample of the population that will answer
the door is highest in the non-warned case, NW, lower for W. and lowest for OO.
Or:
F (a) < 1 and S = 0→ pW (A) = pOO(A) > pNW (A)
F (a) = 1 and S > 0→ pNW (A) > pW (A) > pOO(A)
The proof is once again in the appendix, and the intuition is similar to the rst
prediction of being home.
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2.3.2.3 Predicted Probability of purchasing, price and social pressure
Predictions also follow from the variation of price and social pressure in ex-
perimental treatments. There is no way for the household to know the price or the
variation in social pressure prior to answering the door so both factors only inuence
the decision to purchase once the door has been answered. Two sets of predictions
result, one for price:
pj(A|H, pL) < pj(A|H, pH) for jε{NW,W,OO}
and one for social pressure:
pj(A|H, ρ0) < pj(A|H, ρL) < pj(A|H, ρM) for jε{NW,W,OO}.
In these two sets of predictions, pLand pHare the $1 and $5 treatments, respectively,
while ρ0, ρL, and ρH indicate the treatments neutral frame, social norm low and
social norm high. These predictions follow directly from comparative static results
for the attitude threshold discussed above.
2.4 Experimental Design and Implementation
The theoretical model above directly informs the design of our natural eld
experiment, which could be utilized for any energy ecient technology but was used
for CFLs in this research. Beginning with the second stage, script and price treat-
ments provides variation to identify the impact of social pressure and price on the
decision to purchase. However, the decision to purchase could be due to underlying
social pressure present in all treatments or the private and public attributes of the
purchase. The model's rst stage suggests a treatment to parse the impacts of atti-
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Figure 2.3: Treatment Cells
tude and social pressure through including a treatment allowing consumers to select
into or out of the purchase situation. In order to provide households with the oppor-
tunity to select out of the purchase situation, door-hangers were placed on the doors
of households the day before the households were visited to oer CFLs for purchase.
These door-hangers, shown in gure 2.2, informed the household that it would be
visited the following day by someone with an oer for purchase and discuss energy
saving light bulb options, creating the opportunity for the household members to
vary their likelihood of being home. In total, there are 18 treatment cells in the
experimental design. These cells are displayed in gure 2.3 . Table 2.1 gives the
sample size by treatment cell. The experimental implementation and treatments will
be discussed more in depth below. The experiment was implemented by oering
households up to 2 packages of CFLs to purchase at their doorstep (each package
contained 4 CFLs). Approaching consumers at their doors may not appear to be
the most applicable method for technology adoption. However, energy conservation
programs often employ door-to-door approaches to encourage adoption of technolo-
gies such as CFLs. Some examples of recent programs are the Clean Development
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Table 2.1: Treatment Sample Size
Table 2.2: Survey Results on CFL Opinions
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Mechanism projects in the South Urban Lahore district of Pakistan and Visakhap-
tanam India, and a door-to-door project in Boulder, Colorado in the summer of
2010. Although there is a natural interest in working within stores, that setting
would provide a select sample of consumers looking to replace their light bulbs. On
one hand such a sample is of interest, but the benets gained by installing CFLs
is immediate and thus an ideal sample to approach is all consumers that use tradi-
tional incandescent light bulbs. Further, approaching households directly allows for
greater ease of warning a household ahead of time as well as direct control of the
stated social norm, which are necessary for uncovering the impact of social pressure.
Households were approached during the day on weekends by University of
Chicago students employed through the Becker Center at the University of Chicago.
The students were hired after responding to job advertisements placed around the
campus of the University of Chicago and on the University's main electronic help
wanted web site (marketplace.uchicago.edu). After responding to the advertisement,
the students were briey interviewed. The students were then hired and given a
time to come back for a training session. The training sessions lasted approximately
30 minutes and were conducted with multiple students so that they could practice
scripts with each other.
Students were driven out to the suburbs on Saturdays and Sundays to approach
households over 4 one-hour blocks of time each day: 10 a.m. to 11 a.m., 11 a.m.
to noon, 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 3 p.m. The households were grouped
into these hour-long blocks for the students, with each block containing roughly 25
houses and each one-hour block of houses randomly assigned to a treatment so that
78
a given student typically had a dierent treatment each hour. The CFL sales took
place on weekends between June 2009 and June 2010 with a break in the winter
months and on weekend days when it was either too cold or raining.
Households in the following locations around Chicago were approached: Ar-
lington Heights, Elmwood Park, Evanston, Lemont, Libertyville, Oak Park, River
Forest, Roselle, Skokie, and Wheaton. These suburbs range in median household
income from $47,315 to $89,284 as reported in the 2000 U.S. Census ($1999). This is
in comparison to the United States national and Illinois median household incomes
of $41,994 and $46,590 respectively. Clearly the sample approached in this study
had higher median incomes then is typical in the U.S. One concern with lower in-
come areas is that it is not possible to go door-to-door within apartment complexes,
making it necessary to use locations with free-standing houses which are most often
found in higher income areas. Regardless, the range of median incomes from the
areas visited is an important caveat to our results and limits the generalizability of
the results.
In addition to the main treatments which will be discussed next, surveys were
conducted after the purchase decision was made. The surveys were intended to
provide some indications of a consumer's interest in and preferences for or against
CFLs. The survey rate is considerably lower than the door answer rate at 7.2%
versus 32%. Table 2 reports results from two survey questions regarding the decision
to own or plan on purchasing CFLs. The results indicate that disposal and quality
concerns are the main factors keeping consumers from utilizing CFLs while energy
eciency is the most often reported reason for owning.
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The day prior to the students visiting households, a team of researchers and
interns placed door-hangers on households in W and OO treatments. While placing
the door-hangers on doors, the researchers and interns only interacted with members
of the households if they were approached directly (i.e. household members were
outside in the yard and witnessed the placement of the door-hanger). Although
the student sales-persons were aware of the dierent scripts and prices for each
treatment, they were not aware that only some houses had been warned of the visit
the day prior via the door-hangers.
The main treatments were delivered through scripts given to student sales-
persons for each one-hour treatment block of households. The scripts varied in two
ways: stated social norm and sale price of CFL package (see appendix for scripts).
The CFLs sold door-to-door cost between $3.85 and $7.15 for a package of 4 CFLs,
before tax, in stores throughout the Chicago area. The average price tended to be
around $5.00 when tax was included so we set our baseline price for a package of
4 CFLs at $5.00. We included one other price point, a low price of $1.00.12 The
low price of $1.00 was chosen for a number of reasons. The main reason is that,
depending on quality and type, a package of 4 incandescent light bulbs can range
from $0.33 to $5.00 but is typically around $1.00. Thus, pricing the package of 4
CFLs at $1.00 made it reasonably equivalent to purchasing a new package of incan-
descent light bulbs. A secondary reason was that logistically, selling goods for $5.00
and $1.00 simplies producing change from purchases.
12Although demand is likely non-linear, only two prices were chosen due to sample size con-
straints. In the future, we hope to include a third price point to address the possibility of non-linear
demand.
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Social pressure can be applied in a number of ways to varying degrees of
ecacy. For example, psychologists have written extensively on approaches specic
to door-to-door sales such as the 'Foot-in-the-Door approach and the Door-in-
the-Face approach. As discussed in the literature review above, recent research
has found social norms to be an eective social-psychological pathway to impact a
person's decisions. This led us to incorporate social norms into our experimental
design as a test for the impact that social-psychology can have on adoption. In order
to incorporate social norms, a script without a statement of social norms, referred to
as the Neutral Frame (NF) treatment, and two treatments involving a statement
of social norms, Social Norm Low (SNL) and Social Norm High (SNH), were
run. Both social norm treatments augment the general NF script by one statement
prior to stating the price. SNL uses the phrase: For instance, did you know that
70% of U.S. households own at least one CFL? while the SNH treatment uses the
phrase: For instance, did you know that 70% of the households that we surveyed
in this area own at least one CFL? The change in the proximity with which the
social norm is stated follows in line with Goldstein et al. (2008).
Since the treatments come directly from theory they act as a natural test of
the model's predictions. In addition, including variation in social pressure and price
allows for a pricing of social pressure as will be discussed in the results. Further,
analyzing not only the decision to purchase but considering also how many packages
of CFLs were purchased permits some indication of whether consumers appear to be
buying out of social pressure or buying in to a new technology due to information
contained in the social norm.
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2.5 Results
The results in this section consider the probability of being home, the proba-
bility of purchasing, and the probability of purchasing zero, one or two packages of
CFLs. The results support an overall story that social pressure, in addition to price,
has a signicant impact on the decision to purchase. A considerable amount of this
story is explained simply by considering the raw means. However, a two step hurdle
model was run in order to control for additional factors and explore the decision to
purchase one or two packages.
The two step hurdle model that was run is conventional in nature. First, a
probit model with xed eects for solicitor s, time t, day d and city c was estimated
with an outcome of the decision to purchase or not. The probit model is specied
as follows:
y∗i,s,t,d,c = β0 + βXi,s,t,d,c + δTi,s,t,d,c + γs + νt + ωd + ηc + εi,s,t,d,c
where y∗i,s,t,d,c is a latent variable that is not observed but instead is represented by
a discrete variable indicating whether the household decided to purchase any pack-




if y∗ > 0
if y∗ ≤ 0
. The independent variable
Xi,s,t,d,c, is the one recorded variable from each household: Do you own CFLs?
and Ti,s,t,d,c are treatment variables (social pressure variables are dummy variables
while price is included as a continuous measure). Finally, γs, νt, ωd, ηc and εi,s,t,d,c
are conventional error terms. In some specications, treatment dummy variables
were interacted with other treatment dummies and with Xi,s,t,d,c but for simplicity
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the model can be represented as above. The second step of the hurdle model was
estimating the number of packages purchased for the sub-sample that chose to pur-
chase using a Truncated Poisson model utilizing the same variables as the linear
probability model with the dependent outcome variable as the number of packages
purchased, either 1 or 2.
2.5.1 Selection: the impact of warning households
The consumer's decision on whether to be home is a main factor in the theoret-
ical model developed above. This selection decision helps parse the impact of social
pressure from the private and public attributes of CFLs. Intuitively, a household
that avoids answering its door places the impact of social pressure above the ben-
ets that could be gained from answering. As mentioned above, the experimental
design utilizes door-hangers, shown in gure 2.2, placed on a household's door the
day before the student solicitors arrived to allow for a household to select into or out
of interacting with student salespersons. Using this experimental approach, DLM
nds evidence that social pressure has a larger impact than the desire to donate
to charities and our results are consonant with DLM's results: households avoid
student salespersons when warned.
Table 2.3 reports the results for the doors answered and the purchase decision.
The top half of table 2.3 reports the raw data while the bottom half includes the
answer, purchase and conditional purhcase rates as well as results from a chi-square
test of proportion. As shown in table 2.3, houses that were not warned answered
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the door 36.72% of the time, while households that were warned answered the door
33.22% and 27.39% of the time for the W and OO treatments respectively. Given
the predictions in section 3.2.1, these results point towards the existence of social
pressure. However, results from table 2.3 provide mixed support for the predictions
in section 3.2.2 that assume the existence of social pressure. Unconditional on
answering the door, houses that were not warned purchased 3.21% of the time,
while households in the W and OO treatments purchased CFL's 3.83% and 2.81%
of the time respectively. While the dierence in purchase rates between the NW
and OO treatments is consistent with the predictions under the extreme scenarios
of our model discussed above, the dierence across the W and NW treatments is
not. Overall, the results point to the existence of social pressure but not to one
of the extreme cases discussed in the previous section, rather that social pressure
exists and that there are attitude types that are interested in purchasing CFLs.
An intuitive prediction from the selection permitted by the door-hangers is
that, conditional on answering the door in the warned treatments, we should expect
to see more purchases. This is indeed the case as shown in table 2.3. Conditional on
answering the door, households in the W and OO treatments are purchasing 11.54%
and 10.27% of the time compared to 8.75% of the time for households that are not
warned. The signicant dierence between purchasing conditional on answering be-
tween the NW and W treatments suggests that warned households are selecting into
answering their door knowing that they will be able to purchase the new technol-
ogy. Evidence of increased purchases by households in OO and W treatments is also
found in the fully specied regression results in table 2.6b discussed below. In short,
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Table 2.3: Warning Treatment Results: Doors Answered and Purchase Decision
Table 2.4: Price and Social Norm Treatment Results: Purchase Decision Conditional
on Answering
it appears that while both treatments positively aect the likelihood of purhcase,
only the W treatment is signicant and only the OO treatment has a signicant
impact on the number of packages purchased.
2.5.2 Comparison of Means: Economic and Social-Psychology Treat-
ments
The results for mean purchase rates across the price and social norm treatments
are shown in table 2.4. As can be seen from the table, price has a large and signicant
impact on demand, with our price reduction from $5 to $1 resulting in almost a
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Table 2.5: Price and Social Pressure Elasticities
250% increase in the decision to purchase. Incorporating the amount of packages
purchased into these raw results leads to a mid-point price elasticity of demand
of -.844 under the NF treatment as shown in table 2.5. With the caveat that the
variation in price is quite large, this elasticity measurement can be used with the
results of the social-psychology treatments to provide a price estimate on the value
of the social norms used here. Before discussing that implied elasticity, rst consider
results from using the statement of social norms reported in table 2.4.
The results in table 2.4 suggest that stating social norms does impact the de-
cision to adopt new technology with both the SNL and SNH treatments having a
signicantly higher rate of purchase than NF. As reported in table 2.4, 7.94% of the
households that answer their door purchase in the NF treatment, while 11.21% and
11.54% of households decided to purchase in the SNL and SNH treatments respec-
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Table 2.6a: Two Stage Hurdle Model Estimates
tively. This 40% increase in the purchase rate is somewhat surprising considering
the small amount of additional information provided in these treatments. Although
table 2.4 suggests that the SNL treatment has a large eect, this eect declines
and loses signicance when control variables are included in a probit regression as
reported in tables 2.6a and 2.6b. On the other hand, tables 2.6a and 2.6b
show that the low price and the SNH treatment, which uses a statement from
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Table 2.6b: Two Stage Hurdle Model Estimates
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households in increased proximity to the approached household, continue to have
an impact with the inclusion of control variables.
As mentioned, an important result from our initial study is the ability to
price the impact of the social norm used. The mid-point price elasticity of demand
under the NF treatment is -0.845. As shown in table 2.5, based on this elasticity,
the reduction in price that would result in the same quantity change as that of
introducing a statement similar to our SNH treatment at $5.00 is 70%. That is,
stating the high social norm when the CFL packages cost $5.00 results in the
same increase in demand as reducing the package price to roughly $1.50! Even SNL
has a surprising impact on purchase rates: the equivalent of a 30% price reduction,
or a reduction in price to roughly $3.50.
2.5.3 Hurdle Model: Economic and Social-Psychology Treatments
Tables 2.6a and 2.6breport the results for a number of specications of a two
stage hurdle model of CFL adoption in a series of 8, 2-column pairs for each speci-
cation run. The left column of each pair reports the Probit model while the right
column reports estimates from the Truncated Poisson model. The specication for
each model increases in the amount of control variables moving from left to right
across each table and from table 2.6a to 2.6b. Table 2.6a does not include any xed
eects, and begins with the rst two columns of the table as the baseline model
which includes dichotomous control variables for the two social norm treatments:
Social Norm Low (SNL) and Social Norm High (SNH), the two warning treatments:
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Table 2.7: Door-Hanger Type Treatment Results: Doors Answered and Purchase
Decision
OO and W, and a dummy variable, Low Price, indicating the $1 treatment. Addi-
tionally, dichotomous indicators are included for houses that received a door-hanger
stating Environment Initiative (Warning-Env and Opt Out-Env) rather than
Energy Cost Initiative; there was no signicant dierence in either doors answered
or purchase rates so the results have been pooled.13 The last 2 columns of table 2.6a
include the coecient estimates for the fully specied model without xed eects.
In addition to the variables in the baseline regression, the fully specied model in-
cludes seven additional controls. The Own CFLs variable indicates whether the
household currently owns CFLs. This variable is the result of the solicitors asking
each household if they currently have or are familiar with CFLs. However, because
households did not always respond to the inquiry a second variable is included in
the analysis, Own CFLs Missing, which indicates if the household did not respond.
These missing values in Own CFLs are recorded as zeros. The coecient on Own
13The results of the comparison are found in table 2.7 for the number of doors answered and the
purchases conditional on answering.
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CFLs Missing is negative and signicant in the probit regressions for all speci-
cations, which is in line with a presumption that missing values indicate a shorter
conversation (an immediate No) at the household.
Table 2.6b adds four sets of xed eects to the more fully specied model in
the last two columns of table 2.6a: City indicating the City, Village or Suburb the
household is in, Time denoting one of the four possible hours (10am, 11am, 1pm
and 2pm), Day for the day of the weekend (Saturday or Sunday), and Surveyor
for one of the 47 surveyors. The last four columns represent the eighth and nal
hurdle model which includes all controls and xed eects. Marginal eects are only
included for this fully specied model to conserve space as it is the focus of the
interpretation of the results.
The impact of Own CFLs on the decision to purchase is negative and insignif-
icant for all specications. This inconclusively implies that new consumers may be
more likely to adopt the technology. On the other hand, conditional on purchasing,
Own CFLs has a signicant positive eect on the amount purchased under the
more fully specied models. This suggests that consumers that do own CFLs are
taking advantage of having the CFLs oered to them at their door by purchasing
an additional package in comparison to consumers that do not own CFLs but, after
accounting for what appear to be immediate No responses through Own CFLs
Missing, are consumers that do not own CFLs are just as likely to purchase as
those that do. Rows 12 to 14 of table 2.6a and 2.6b show that the price and social
norm statements have no signicant impact on consumers that own CFLs as one
would expect. In fact, the eect is insignicantly negative for the purchase amount,
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which may indicate that consumers who own CFLs are reacting negatively to what
they see as a sales pitch.
The coecients on the main treatments point towards an intuitive story of
social pressure and price. Price has a consistent signicant impact across the spec-
ications and, in the full specication, suggests that the low price increases the
likelihood of purchasing by 7.5%. On the other hand, the SNH treatment has a
positive but barely signicant impact (10% condence) on the decision to purchase
with the exception of the fully specied model. Although SNH does not have a
signicant positive impact on purchasing, it does signicantly aect the number of
packages purchased (10% condence). However, the impact of SNH on the amount
purchased is half the size of the low price, suggesting that social pressure motivates
the household to purchase one package while price leads to purchasing two packages,
the maximum allowed. One interpretation of this result is that households are pur-
chasing one package to remove the social pressure imposed in the SNH treatment,
while price motivates purchasing as much as possible.
Somewhat surprisingly, the interaction between SNH and low price does not
increase the amount purchased to a large degree. The interaction term for SNH
and low price is the one signicant interaction term (at the 10% level) and it is
negative. Although it is negative, it is smaller than the coecient on SNH, leading
to an overall positive impact that is slightly larger than the impact from low price
alone. This small positive result implies that when it is less expensive to buy out of
the social pressure from social norms, slightly more households do so. The lack of
large impact from the interaction term may be due to the constraint on purchasing
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only up to 2 packages of CFLs however it is not possible to tell.14
As mentioned briey in section 5.2, contrary to the evidence from the raw
means on the decision to purchase, there is a large dierence in the impact of the
two social norm treatments when control variables are included. Looking across the
specications, the impact of SNL is initially positive and signicant in the spec-
ication with the least amount of covariates but loses signicance when controls
are introduced and also reduces in magnitude. This result provides support for the
importance of how targeted a social norm is and is in line with previous research
(Goldstein et al. (2008)).
2.6 Conclusion
Environmental concerns have grown in recent years and increasing energy ef-
ciency through household technology adoption could alleviate a portion of these
concerns. Unfortunately, adoption of environmental technologies such as CFLs his-
torically has been slow. Our research oers the rst direct comparison across multi-
ple academic disciplines of theories on how to spur technology adoption. This direc-
tion provides greater understanding of the motives surrounding consumer adoption
while also potentially providing the keys to alleviate some of society's concerns over
energy usage and environmental quality.
Non-pecuniary techniques to motivate residential energy conservation used in
research by social psychologists and behavioral economists have generally focused
14Anecdotally, households did occasionally request to receive more lightbulbs, even enticing our
student salespersons to come back with as many as you have. However, allowing for an unlimited
number of packages was not realistic in terms of budgeting for this eld experiment.
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on changing energy usage behavior rather than focusing on encouraging adoption of
energy ecient products. This is evident in broad reviews of the existing literature
such as Abrahamse, Steg, Vlek, and Rothengatter (2005), as well as more recent
research such as Schultz et al. (2007) and Allcott (2009). However, we chose to
focus on motivating technology adoption as a specic behavioral change in order
to avoid the issues that cause the benecial energy conservation results to lessen
over time, such as the boomerang eect and mean reversion. It is possible that
adjustments in lighting usage caused our study to not result in the full energy
reduction potential. We attempt to address this by conducting follow-up interviews
but this should be considered more fully in future research provided that energy
usage data can be obtained.
The results from our initial study suggest that in addition to price reductions,
social norms do play a role in the decision to adopt new technology. As reported
above, 7.94% of the households that answer their door purchase in the neutral frame
treatment, while 11.21% and 11.54% of households decided to purchase in the SNH
and SNL treatments. However, only the SNH treatment has a signicantly positive
impact across most of the specications and a signicant eect at the 10% level on
the number of packages being purchased.
Although price and social norms both have an eect, the eect on the amount
purchased through SNH was found to be half the size of the eect from price. This
results implies that price and social norms aect consumers on two dierent margins.
Price appears to aect the intensive margin by motivating consumers to purchase
as much as possible, while social norms aects the extensive margin by getting
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consumers to purchase one package.
Price and social norms working on dierent margins has important implica-
tions when considering how to motivate consumers to utilize new environmental
technologies. The results suggest that the use of price reductions through subsi-
dies should be considered when there is a desire to encourage further diusion of
the technology, while social-psychology motivations should be considered when at-
tempting to encourage adoption. This intriguing result is intuitive and could be
easily explored further in future research.
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Chapter 3
The Value of Choice: A WTA Estimate of an "Opt-Out" Option to
Adopt Environmental Technology
3.1 Introduction
The decision to consent to an action seems simple enough, either you approve of
the action or you do not. However, empirical evidence points to starkly higher rates
of consent if consent is presumed from the outset using what is known as an opt-out
consent procedure rather than an opt-in procedure which requires explicit consent.
Sunstein and Thaler (2003) discusses the possible social and even personal benets
resulting from this libertarian paternalistic opt-out procedure, but also points out
concerns expressed by many individuals for how it aects an agent's ability to choose.
The concern is that an agent's choice is inuenced by consent procedures, such as
opt-out, which do not require her to take action when making a decision. This debate
implicitly suggests an agent places value on making the choice herself. However,
agents' values for the ability to take action in these procedures appear to have not
been rigorously investigated. This paper rst contributes additional evidence to the
discrepancy between opt-out and opt-in procedures and then provides a rst step
towards understanding how much value agent's place on taking action in opt-out
procedures. This is done by estimating an apartment tenant's willingness to accept
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(WTA) to forgo an opt-out option to adopt water and energy saving aerator faucets
such as low-ow shower heads in apartment units in Denver, CO.
Data for the empirical evaluation of this research is generated through a natural
eld experiment run at 13 apartment buildings, managed by Equity Residential
(ER), in the Denver area. Both opt-in and opt-out procedures were conducted by
having building managers place notices throughout the apartment buildings and in
tenant mailboxes in order to announce an opportunity to install new water and
energy saving aerator faucets. The notice can be seen in gure 3.1 with adjustments
for treatment groups denoted in italics within parentheses. The notices diered in
two ways based on treatment: 1) opt-in or opt-out and 2) inclusion or exclusion of
a social norm statement.1 If a tenant accepted the oer, the aerators were provided
for free and installed by the apartment building maintenance sta at no cost to the
tenant. In the opt-out treatments, if a tenant chose to opt-out, she was subsequently
oered $0, $5, $10 or $20 in gift cards, depending on treatment, in exchange for
overturning her opt-out decision and having the technology installed (thus forgoing
her opt-out option).
A tenant's decision regarding the nancial oer to forgo use of an opt-out
option reveals whether the oer was adequate compensation to forgo her ability to
take action and opt-out. This information is used to estimate her WTA to forgo
the option. Due to the design of the experiment, the outcome evaluated is not a
comparison of opt-out and opt-in procedures but rather a comparison of opt-out and
1The statement that was included is: Based on a recent survey, nine out of ten people who
live in our Denver properties tell us that living an environmentally friendly lifestyle is important
to them. This can be seen in gure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Notice for Apartment Residents (Italics Dierentiate Language for Treat-
ments)
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what has been referred to as mandatory consent. Mandatory consent is perhaps
poorly phrased as consent is not requested at all but rather, the action is mandated.
However, agents can takes steps after wards to reverse the action.2 Mandatory
consent is a truly paternalistic act and thus, valuing a tenant's option to opt-out
should be seen against this comparison procedure rather than a more libertarian
method. This valuation does result in a WTA measure that represents an agent's
willingness to forgo her ability to take action and opt-out. However, because it is
impossible to receive money to forgo an opt-out option without also deciding to opt
back in, an alternative interpretation for the WTA estimate arises: the WTA to
opt back in to adoption. This is a completely reasonable alternative interpretation
and cannot be separated in this case from the decision to forgo an opt-out option
because the WTA estimate is generated for tenants that have chosen to opt-out. 3
The sample used for this study is a seemingly often overlooked sample for
studies on environmental technology adoption: the approximately 32% of rented
occupied housing in the United States (2007).4 This sample was a natural choice to
use to investigate a question on adopting environmental technology because renters
often either respond to new technology being oered through promotion programs,
2For example, in the case of an organ donor registry, mandatory consent would result in all
agents being signed up for the registry but providing an ability for the agent to remove herself
from the registry later. Mandatory consent is not far from current policy as, for example, the U.S.
Congress passed legislation in 2007 that bans incandescent light bulbs in 2014.
3An alternative eld experiment that could identify a value for just the opt-out option, would
be to oer money to those that decide to forgo the the opt-out option. However, this alternative
would be much more expensive to conduct or result in severely limited ranges of values oered
to subjects. Further, this estimate would suer from the alternative interpretation of WTA to
adopt. Alternatively, a WTP for the opt-out option could be estimated through oering tenants
the option of paying to not adopt. That was not an option in this circumstance and suers from
similar alternative interpretations.
4American Housing Survey for the United States: 2007 http://www.census.gov/hhes/
www/housing/ahs/ahsfaq.html
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or adopt new technology because landlords force them to.5 This sample generated
a key discrepancy found in other research on such things as organ donation and
retirement savings programs: utilizing an opt-in procedure results in a lower rate of
adoption, 24.46%, than an opt-out procedure, 91.19% (e.g. Abadie and Gay (2004),
Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009)). Unfortunately, only one apartment
building was placed in the opt-in treatment because the low rate of installation
was insucient for apartment management company, ER, to justify continuing the
treatment. Thus, although this limited sample of data is interesting and in line with
the stark dierences to earlier results it is far from conclusive.
The results for the WTA to forgo the opt-out option are suggestive that tenants
do place value on the ability to opt-out: only 7 of 153 tenants that opted out
accepted monetary oers. This level of non-response to the monetary oers resulted
in a mean lower bound WTA estimate of $18.88 that was constrained to a great
deal by the highest value oered in the experiment: $20. Thus, the actual WTA
could be much larger and this result should be truly be taken as a lower bound
estimate. For instance, taken at face value this result implies that oering $18.88
to tenants should on average induce them to forgo their opt-out decision or that
forcing tenants to adopt the aerators only causes those that would opt-out $18.88
of disutility. However, realistically the true WTA could be much larger for these
tenants and ER, the principal in this case, would need to consider how this disutility
would cause the tenants to respond.6 Future research should consider increasing this
5Apartment management will typically use mandatory consent through announcing installation
of a new technology to be adopted in all apartment units.
6If the principal were a social planner, it would instead be a trade o between the energy and
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constraint (keeping research budgets in mind!) in order to better explore the WTA
estimate.
This appears to be the rst investigation of its kind. The information gained
from this project will inform how to encourage adoption of new environmental tech-
nologies and further understand the welfare implications of consent procedures. The
next section places this research in the existing literature. Section 3 covers the ex-
perimental design. Two econometric approaches used are briey discussed in section
4. Section 5 contains the results while section 6 provides a short discussion.
3.2 Literature
The economic literature on opt-in and opt-out programs is not extensive in
the eld of environmental technology adoption. In fact, this paper appears to be
the rst in the area and the rst to estimate a value for having an opt-out option.
However, looking more broadly for literature on presumed and explicit consent,
previous research often nds a substantial dierence between the two procedures.
An often cited result when discussing opt-in and opt-out procedures is the dierence
in organ donation rates between the two procedures. Abadie and Gay (2004) looked
at organ donation rates in 22 dierent countries over a 10-year time period and found
that countries using presumed consent had between 25-30% higher donation rates
than those with explicit consent, after controlling for other determinants of donation
rates. Similarly, Johnson and Goldstein (2003) compared raw consent rates for 11
cost savings of the technology in comparison to the disutility of the individuals that did not want
to adopt.
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countries and found an almost 60% dierence between opt-out and opt-in consent
procedures. The study went further to conduct an online survey with a hypothetical
question of whether the respondent would donate their organs. The 161 respondents
were randomly placed into opt-in, opt-out and neutral or no default treatments and
the results showed that the opt-out treatment led to donation rates almost twice as
high as the opt-in treatment (42% vs. 82%) and that the no default treatment led
to rates comparable to opt-out (79%).
Presumed versus explicit consent has also been investigated in the context of
investment decisions. Madrian and Shea (2001) rst demonstrated the dierence
using data from before and after a change in consent procedures for enrolling in a
401(k) plan at a large company. The change was from an opt-in procedure to an
opt-out procedure and the results showed that, when the appropriate sub-sample
was compared (short tenure or recently employed employees), the opt-out consent
procedure resulted in a 50% increase in the participation rate accounting for various
covariates such as rage, age and gender. More recently, large dierences between
consent procedure were found in Beshears, Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009), which
discusses the impact of opt-out options on savings broadly and points to raw data
from one company that shows a 35% dierence in enrollment in savings plan de-
pending on procedure, and Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler (2007) which focuses the
discussion on the Pension Protection Act of 2006 but points to raw data on retire-
ment investment plan participation rates that have increased 68.5% due to switching
from opt-in to opt-out procedures. The natural eld experiment discussed in this
paper adds to this previous literature by providing another disparity in consent rates
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dependent on procedure under another context: environmental technology adoption.
This paper also extends the literature by being the rst of its kind to provide an
empirical estimate for how much agents are aected by consent procedures.
While the opt-out method has been found to increase participation rates, it
comes with ethical reservations. For example, medical ethics committees have been
assessing the research recruitment, testing and vaccination procedures with a con-
cern that opt-out procedures may aect patients in an unethical way by inuencing
their decisions (Halpern, Ubel and Asch (2007) and Junghans et al. (2005)). Sep-
arately, there is currently a debate over whether and how to restrict information
gathering procedures on the Internet, with the choice of either opt-in or opt-out
procedures as a main question (Johnson, Bellman and Lohse 2002). While there
are several ethical considerations to be made, it is clear that the opt-in treatment
has had an impact when applied (see for further discussion on ethical use of default
options). The ethical reservations give some indication of the issues that some have
with presumed consent that are discussed in Sunstein and Thaler (2003). Although
these ethical concerns seem well formed and are discussed broadly, there is little
empirical evidence of the welfare impacts of the procedures (Choi et al. 2001 and
Choi et al. 2003 consider optimal default options and behavior for savings plans).
This paper attempts to ll this gap in the literature and inform the level of ethical
concern by estimating a WTA for removing an option to opt-out.
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3.3 Experimental Design
The natural eld experiment was run at apartment buildings located through-
out the city of Denver, Colorado. Thirteen apartment buildings with an average
of 319 occupied apartment units per building were randomly assigned into treat-
ment groups. The apartment buildings are owned and operated by Equity Resi-
dential (ER), a company that owns and operates apartment buildings throughout
the United States. ER has a desire to improve the environmental eciency of their
buildings without negatively aecting the opinions of tenants. With these goals in
mind, I worked with ER to determine a feasible treatment design to determine the
value that tenants place on their ability to decide on installing new environmen-
tal technology in their apartments. The new technology that ER wanted tenants
to consider installing was low-ow aerators such as shower heads and other faucet
heads. There are a variety of types of low-ow aerators with some saving up to 50%
of water consumption and 50% of the energy cost from water heating. Neither ER
nor the tenants faced any monetary costs for the aerators or for installation because
Denver Water covered both the technology's cost and installation.
The initial goals of the experiment were to explore the dierence in opt-in
and opt-out consent procedures for environmental technology, generate an estimate
for the value that tenants place on the procedures, and assess the impact that a
social norm statement has on these procedures. To achieve these goals, the sample
was initially split into apartment buildings that would receive opt-in procedures and
those that would receive opt-out procedures, and both sub-samples had treatments
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involving the social norm statement and monetary incentives. However, upon re-
ceiving the rst round of opt-in results which consisted of two apartment buildings
(one each of opt-in and opt-out), ER decided that it could not continue running
the opt-in treatments in additional buildings. Thus, only one apartment building
received the opt-in treatment. Although this decision by ER altered the original ex-
perimental design, it occurred early enough in the experiment to adjust the design
and expand the treatment cells aimed at determining the WTA to forgo an opt-out
option.
Building managers in each of the apartment buildings placed notices through-
out the apartment buildings and in tenant mailboxes to announce the opportunity to
install new aerators. The notices can be seen in gure 3.1 with the adjustments for
treatment groups denoted in italics within parentheses for the two dierences based
on treatment: 1) opt-in or opt-out and 2) inclusion or exclusion of the following
social norm statement: Based on a recent survey, nine out of ten people who live
in our Denver properties tell us that living an environmentally friendly lifestyle is
important to them. Such notices are common for apartment buildings managed by
ER, as is the method of response that was used for this experiment: the web based
survey platform SurveyMonkeyTM. The statistic used in the social norm statement
was generated from a previous survey conducted by ER. The intent of including
the statement was to determine if social norms could be utilized to encourage fewer
tenants to opt-out because social norms have been found to be eective promoting
energy conservation in previous research (Herberich, List and Price (2010), Ferraro
and Price (2010), Allcott (2009) and Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius (2008)).
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Tenants responded to the notice by accessing the website provided on the
notice. Naturally, this imposes a cost on the tenants that would like to opt-out.
Although ER states that their tenants have access to the Internet and, further,
that a majority of the tenants communicate with ER managers, establish their
rental contract and pay their monthly rent on the Internet, this caveat concerning
transaction costs needs to be acknowledged. Unfortunately, no clean test of how
much of a hindrance this transaction cost was is available. Those tenants that
accessed the website provided on the notice were directed to an Internet based survey
that was dierentiated based on treatment. The surveys were accessed via slightly
dierentiated web names, for example: http://tinyurl.com/DenverWaterForm and
http://tinyurl.com /SurveyDenverWater. An opt-out version of the rst page of
the survey is displayed in the upper half of gure 3.2 . The opt-in version only diers
by option four: Please do not install water saving xtures in my apartment, being
replaced with: Please install water saving xtures in my apartment. Tenants that
chose to opt-out or opt-in in the treatments that did not receive nancial oers were
directed to a second page that thanked them for their time.
Tenants that chose to opt-out and were in treatments that received nan-
cial oers were directed to an additional page oering compensation to alter their
decision. There were a total of 3 dierent payment treatments which diered in
the amount of compensation oered to the renter: i) $5, ii) $10 and iii) $20. The
amounts were chosen in part due to nancial constraints given such a large num-
ber of potential subject payments but with the expectation that these values would
provide a suitable range of responses. Unfortunately, as the data below indicates,
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Figure 3.2: First Webpage of Survey: Opt-Out Version
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Table 3.1: Installation and Apartment Information by Treatments
Table 3.2: Chi-square Tests of Dierence in Installation Rates
these oers were not very eective in inducing tenants to reverse their opt-out deci-
sion. An example of a $20 oer is shown in gure 3.2 below the initial survey page.
The tenants rejecting this oer were directed to a nal page that thanked them for
their time, while those that accepted were oered the choice of gift cards to either
Starbucks or Borders.
In total, the experiment consisted of 6 treatment groups which can be seen
in column 1 of table 3.1. The 6 treatments are based on 3 main variants: i)
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Table 3.3: Responses and Turnbull Estimation Results: Willingness To Accept
(WTA)
opt-in or opt-out, ii) money oered and iii) social norm statement. The Out-In
treatment included the social norm statement and was the only treatment involving
opt-in procedures; three of the treatments involved oering nancial compensation
and included the social norm statement: opt-out $5, opt-out $10 and opt-out
$20; and there were two treatments using the opt-out procedure that didn't oer
nancial compensation: Opt-Out Control and OO Without Survey. The Opt-
Out Control treatment is identical to the treatments oering compensation except
it did not include oering compensation, while the OO Without Survey treatment
removes the social norm statement from the notice and does not oer compensation.7
The rst four columns of table 3.1 list the treatments and provide information
on the sample. The rst column has the dierent treatments in each row, the
7To be clear: All treatments other than OOWithout Survey included the social norm statement
discussed next.
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second column gives the number of apartment buildings in each treatment group
and the fourth column gives the number of apartment units in the treatment groups.
As table 3.1 indicates, treatment was assigned at the apartment level. This was
done to avoid within building discussions concerning treatments. Although this
portion of the experimental design was inuenced by ER's desire to avoid tenant
disputes concerning fairness, assigning treatment at the building level also reduced
the likelihood that renters in each apartment would become aware that they were
part of an experiment.
Column 3 of table 3.1 provides the average apartment price for each treatment
group. As seen in table 3.1 the sample is not perfectly balanced in terms of size or
apartment price. Some information was available prior to determining the samples
and an attempt was made to randomly draw the sample balanced on these measures.
However, due to the small number of apartment buildings at which treatment was
assigned, balancing the sample was severely hindered.
The experiment was conducted between February and May of 2010. Dierent
apartment buildings received the announcements at dierent times in order to stag-
ger the installation time of the aerators. Tenants were given 2 weeks to respond to
the notices and installation occurred between 1 and 2 weeks after the survey was
closed. Tenants that chose to receive compensation for forgoing their opt-out option
received compensation in the form of a gift card for either Starbucks or Borders.
Gifts cards simplied the payment process which consisted of mailing the cards to
tenants from ER's corporate Oce in Chicago. No cash oers were made so it is
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not possible to know how the tenants valued the gifts cards in comparison to cash.8
3.4 Empirical Methodology
There are two outcomes of interest in this research. First, the overall dier-
ence between opt-in and opt-out consent procedures. These results will be evaluated
using Chi-square tests for dierences in proportions. In order to account for clus-
tering at the apartment building level, an adjusted Chi-square is used that was
rst suggested for survey data in Rao and Scott (1984). Second, the monetary
treatments permit an estimate of the apartment renter's WTA, which is calculated
with a Turnbull estimator. The Turnbull estimator was rst introduced in Turnbull
(1976). Haab and McConnell (1997) thoroughly covers the positive properties of
this non-parametric estimator. The Turnbull estimator is often used for calculating
WTP and is derived in regard to this so an alternate derivation to the standard
empirical theory is provided in this section.
The Turnbull estimator follows from the intuitive notion of building a cumu-
lative density function (CDF) based on the proportion of yes or no responses to
WTP or WTA survey questions. At its essence, the estimator uses the responses
to construct probability density weights to provide the appropriate weighting for
each monetary oer, $vj, and then builds a WTA estimate from the weighted val-
ues. That is, consider a response to the WTA question: Would you change
your mind and accept installation for a $vj gift card? If respondent i
8Given the popularity of these stores, I do not feel that oering these options for gift cards
dramatically eects the estimation from that which would result from oering cash.
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says yes to the previous question, it is known that WTAi ≤ $vj, where WTAi
represents individual i's willingness to accept. By assuming respondents WTA
has some distribution F , the probability of a randomly chosen individual having
a WTA less than $vjand thus saying yes to the question above, can be repre-
sented as: Pr(WTAi ≤ $vj) = F (vj) = Fj.9 The probability that a respondent's
WTA is in the interval between vj−1and vj can then be represented by pjwhere
pj = Pr(vj−1 < WTA ≤ vj) = Fj − Fj−1for j = 1, 2, 3...M + 1.10 Each probability
can then be used to weight the oers and construct the WTA estimate.
For purposes of discussing the estimator, let M represent the number of dif-
ferent monetary amounts oered to a random sample of respondents drawn from
the overall population. The random sample can then be broken down into a set of
sub-samples V = {V1, V2...VM}where Vj is the number of agents that received oer
vj, and the yes and number responses can be organized into similarly noted sets of
Y = {Y1, Y2...YM} and N = {N1, N2...NM}, Yj and Nj are the number of agents
that said yes and no to the oer vj, respectively. As a matter of construction,
both the sum of all Vj and the sum of all Yjand Nj result in the total number of
agents. With this notation, the Turnbull estimator is derived formally from the














Haab and McConnell (1997) contains a thorough discussion of the Turnbull es-
timator for estimating WTP. The one deviation for WTA from the WTP derivation
9The notation follows closely to Haab and McConnell (1997). However, here I assume that the
distribution F is continuous so that the strictness of the inequality is irrelevant.
10The value for vM+1is generally taken to be ∞ so that FM+1 = 1.
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in Haab and McConnell (1997) is that Yj and Nj are exactly opposite in the likeli-
hood function. Making this slight adjustment results in the following formulas for





















and V (Fj) =
Fj(1−Fj)
Yj+Nj
. This calculation works for all j so long
as the probability of individuals responding positively to the WTA questions is
increasing monotonically. If this constraint fails, the following correction of pool-
ing responses from multiple oer levels is utilized until the response rate increases










j = Zj + Zj−1.
It is important to clarify two caveats concerning the interpretation of the
estimate in this paper. First, the WTA estimate discussed here is for tenants that
have chosen to opt-out. That is, the tenants must rst choose to opt-out before being
oered money. This small clarication is due to the large portion of the sample that
did not choose to opt-out. It is by assumption that no additional information can
be gained from tenants that decided not to opt-out. An alternative assumption
could be that these tenants have a WTA equal to zero. However, from a practical
standpoint, the WTA is only of interest for tenants who choose to opt-out as only
those individuals would need to be compensated to change their decision. Thus,
although this caveat arises, the estimate of interest is generated by considering only
the population that chooses to use the opt-out option. Under this assumption, the
probability of a tenant's WTA being less than or equal to zero is zero: F (WTA ≤
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v0 = 0) = F0 = 0. The second caveat was rst discussed in the introduction and
is the alternative interpretation for the WTA estimate: the WTA to opt back in to
adoption. This arises because it is impossible to receive money to forgo an opt-out
option without also deciding to opt back, and is a completely reasonable alternative
interpretation.
3.5 Results
The rst outcome of interest is the installation rate across treatments. The
installation rate across all opt-out treatments prior to nancial oers is found at the
bottom of column 5 in table 3.1: 91.30%. This can be directly compared to a much
lower installation rate of 24.46% for the apartment building in the opt-in treatment
found at the top of column 5 in table 3.1. Not surprisingly, a chi-square test of this
dierence of 66.84%, is highly signicant as shown in the top left of table 3.2, which
reports the dierences of pairs of treatments with the p-values below accounting for
intra-cluster correlation at the apartment building level.
There are some concerns with interpreting this initial result as the true opt-out
or opt-in level. First, there is a transaction cost to responding to the notice because
it requires using the Internet, which may discourage some tenants from responding.
Second, it's possible that tenants do not see the notice or that they do not read the
entire not ice in order to respond. Both concerns would result in a decrease in the
probability of response. Through conversations with ER, Internet access appears
to not be a large concern, which leaves the possibility of not seeing the notice or
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some other reason that led a tenant to not realize that there was an action to take.
However, for this to be a concern, approximately 65% of the sample would need
to not see the yers. Although there is no verication, it seems unlikely that such
issues are of great concern.
Table 3.2 also reports results across the opt-out treatment groups. The rst
dierence of note is the dierence with and without the social norm statement
(with and without survey): Based on a recent survey, nine out of ten people who
live in our Denver properties tell us that living an environmentally friendly lifestyle
is important to them. There is a 1.97% decline in the decision to adopt when the
statement is used but it is not signicant. The direction of this result runs counter to
recent research that has shown that social norms positively aect pro-social energy
conservation behavior (Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius (2008), Herberich, List
and Price (2010)). This result may be due to the weakness of the social norm that
was used as the earlier research points out that that references to society with closer
proximity to the agent have had larger impacts on energy saving behaviors than
those of farther proximity. Future research should consider testing stronger social
norm messages such as increasing the proximity of the responses, people who live in
this apartment building, or perhaps increasing the strength of the statement relative
to the technology being adopted, tell us that they enjoy helping the environment
by using these aerators.
One of the interests in including a control group that was not oered compen-
sation to forgo their opt-out option was to see if tenants heard about the post-opt-out
oer prior to making their decision. If this was the case tenants would not other-
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wise opt-out would be more likely to opt-out in order to receive the compensation.
However, the opposite is found: the percentage of respondents opting out is lower
for apartments in the oer treatments 8.66%, 6.61% and 9.69% for the $5, $10 and
$20 oers respectively. Further, the dierences from control for the $5 and $10
treatments are signicant. It is possible that tenants heard about the oer and miss
interpreted as receiving the oer if they did not opt-out. However, no such questions
were reported to the apartment management. It is always possible that this result
comes from the natural heterogeneity in the underlying data, but as these results
are clustered at the apartment building level the signicant results are puzzling.
The second and main outcome of interest is a tenant's decision to accept
compensation for the opt-out option. This outcome leads to the estimation of a
lower bound for the WTA to forgo an opt-out option for aerators, or the alternative
interpretation of the WTA to opt back in. Table 3.3 presents the results for the
Turnbull estimator described in the previous section. Because no one accepted the
$10 oer, the $5 and $10 oers are pooled. The resulting estimate is $18.88 which
is highly aected by the maximum oer due to the low acceptance rate. The range
of oers used in this research may simple have been too low. However, it is also
possible that tenants place an extremely high value on the opt-out option. Further
research could provide evidence in this direction by increasing the maximum oer
amount or by asking a hypothetical question to those tenants not accepting oers.
One interesting result in table 3.3 is the zero acceptance rates for $10 but
the positive rate for both $5 and $20. This results is likely due to random noise
across treatment groups, evidenced by the signicant dierence in opt-out rates
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between the $10 and $20 treatments as reported in table 3.2.11 However, one possible
explanation for this is a crowding out of pro-social behavior (environmentalism etc.).
It is possible that tenants are either willing to accept low oers as just any oer or
indication to encourage them to adopt so long as the oer is low enough so that
they still benet from feeling like they took a pro-social action. However, when that
oer raises it could become to large for a tenant to feel like the action is truly for
society's benet and declines until the oer becomes substantial enough for it to be
worth the oer alone without any of the warm-glow benet. Although this notion
is intriguing, the current data is not able to fully explore such an idea.
3.6 Conclusion
Countries around the world are considering and enacting legislation to force
consumers to use more environmentally ecient technology. For instance, the U.S.
Congress passed legislation in 2007 that bans incandescent light bulbs in 2014. On
one hand, increased adoption of environmental technology could have a profound
aect on the environment. In the case of more ecient aerators considered in this
research, energy and water consumption could be reduced by 50%. However, on the
other hand, a question remains of whether public opinion should result in mandated
adoption or whether the agents place a high value on the ability to opt-out. This
paper nds that the welfare impacts are potentially severe for those individuals that
11It is possible that there is some underlying dierence in tenants that lead to less acceptances:
the lower opt-out rate in the $10 oer treatment could imply that only those with very high
distaste for the new aerators opted out, and thus would need to be compensated greatly to post-
adopt. However, this is not clear as there is no signicant dierence between the $5 and $10 oer
treatments.
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choose to not have the new technology installed.
An extension to this research could utilize water usage rates before and after
adoption to determine if there are any adjustments in faucet usage which would
reduce the eciency gains. This is of interest because there is concern that water
usage changes after adoption, whether it is from renters reinstalling old shower heads
or taking longer showers. Further, it is possible that agents that opt-out may alter
their utilization in comparison to agents that opt-in. Unfortunately, at this time it
has not been possible to obtain water usage rates.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Results Concerning the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment,
Design Value Calculations
A.1 Design Value Calculations1
The design value for ozone is intended to verify that a monitor has not exceeded
a NAAQS more than 3 times in any three year period. Since 1981, the design value
for each monitor has been calculated as the 4th highest monitor reading over the past
three "complete" years of data. A year of data for a monitor is considered complete
if valid maximum monitor readings are recorded for 75% of an "ozone season".2 If
three years of complete data are not available, the number of exceedences decreases
but the data from the prior three year period is still used. For a monitor with two
years of complete data in the previous three years, the 3rd highest measurement
is used as the design value. Similarly, the 2nd highest measurement is used as the
design value for a monitor with one year of complete data. Again, the number of
years of data used is always three years, regardless of whether some of the years are
incomplete. Design values were calculated in accordance with the EPA's assignment
rule for monitors with more than one year of complete data available. First, the
1Details were taken from a June, 18 1990 memorandum from Director William G. Laxton,
EPA's Green Book (http://www.epa.gov/air/oaqps/greenbk/laxton.html)
2Ozone seasons are determined on a state-by-state basis by the Aerometric Information Retrieval
System and can be found here: http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/greenbk/o3season.html.
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number of complete years of data was determined. Then, one-hour daily maximum
ozone emissions for each monitor were ranked and the appropriately ranked mea-
surement was used as the design value. The calculation of a design value is slightly
more complicated if none of the previous three years are complete. For monitors
with less than 90 days of monitor readings during the prior three years, the design
value is determined on a case by case basis. It is not clear what was used to deter-
mine the design value at these monitors so they were excluded from the analysis.
For monitors with more than 90 days of readings during the prior three years, but no
complete year, a two step process given by the EPA was followed to determine the
rank: 1) the number of valid daily maximums during the 3-year period was divided
by the required number of monitoring days per year calculated as 75% of the ozone
season. 2) the resulting quotient was increased by 1 and the integer portion of this
summation was used as the rank for choosing the design value. The completeness
of a year of data is unfortunately determined by two non-recoverable adjustments.
First, days that are assumed to be less than the standard of the NAAQS may be
included in the count of valid days when calculating the percentage of the ozone
season, but it is not clear who decides which days may be included. Second, the
year for new sites may begin with the rst day of monitoring, so long as the data is
complete for 75% of the days between June and August. Both adjustments increase
the likelihood of a year of data being complete; the rst by including extra days and
the second by shortening the season. Because it was not possible to recover these
adjustments, the rank used to select the design value may result in a larger design
value than that actually determined by the EPA.
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A.2 Theoretical discussion of impact of dierent levels of regulation on
time taken to reduce emissions
Consider a social planner deciding the duration of time taken, t, to reduce
emissions to some level, eT , by deadline year T under regulation, R. The social
planer would need to consider the present value of the necessary administrative and
regulatory costs in order to follow the CAAA's policies incurred over the t years
and: C(t|eT ,R). Where the costs of reducing emissions decreases convexly (C'(t| eT
=k, R=r)<0, C(t| eT =k, R=r)>0) because more time adds exibility as well as
diusion of current pollution. A social planner would also consider the welfare and
quasi-rent adjustments when deciding the timeline for reducing emissions to eT . To
simplify the social planner's decision, assume the adjustments are only realized after
eT is achieved and there is no change otherwise. Allow the monetized value of achiev-
ing eT to be represented as b(eT ) so that the present value of achieving eT in year
t is: B(t|eT ) = b(eT )( 11+r )
t+1 , where r is an appropriate discount rate. The basic
problem the social planner faces is thus: max
t
B(t|eT )−C(t|eT , R) and the standard
solution of equating the marginal cost with the marginal adjustment to welfare and
quasi-rent results: B′(t|eT ) = C ′(t|eT , R) =⇒ b(eT )( 11+r )
t+1ln( 1
1+r
) = C ′(t|eT , R)
. An optimal time, t*, exists so long as B′′(t|eT ) ≤ C ′′(t|eT , R) so that the second
order condition is satised for a maximum, for simplicity, assume that a penalty,
P(eT ), is imposed if t>T , and is suciently large so that no solution larger than T is
worthwhile. Using the implicit function theorem to evaluate the impact of regulation
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+ if CtR < 0
0 if CtR = 0
− if CtR > 0

This comparative statistic does not provide a theoretical solution for how regu-
lation impacts t. Further, within this setup, dierent deadlines T should not impact
t other than moving along the corner solution of t=T, so long as the penalty P(eT)
is severe enough. Considering the comparative statistic, it is not possible to theoret-
ically determine that areas under more restrictive regulation should reduce pollution
more or less than areas under less restrictive regulations by the rst milestone of 6
years.
A.3 Further discussion of Regression Discontinuity
If non-attainment categories were randomly assigned, a direct comparison of
mean outcomes, E(y1) and E(y0), could be used rather than an RD design because
random assignment would remove any statistical dependence between the treatment
and the outcome and result in a consistent estimate of the LATE. However, the non-
attainment categories are assigned according to the 1990 CAAA assignment rule and
whether a direct comparison of expected outcomes can be made depends on what
the design value, v, is correlated with. To see this, consider a linear regression which
in eect compares the mean outcomes of the two non-attainment categories:
ya = γ + δTa + εa (A.1)
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where a indicates an area, T is a dummy for being in the stricter non-attainment
category and ε is a conventional normally distributed error term. A consistent
estimate of the ATE is given by δ so long as the identication assumption, E(ε |
1,T )=0, holds (or the weaker assumptions: E(ε)=0 and cov(ε,T)=0, both hold).
One way the identication assumption is violated is if treatment is correlated with
an omitted variable, q, believed to also inuence the outcome (cov(T,q)6=0 and
E(y|T,q) is the conditional expectation of interest). Assuming q has an additive
eect on y, including q in 1.1 results in:
ya = γ + δTa + βqa + εa (A.2)
If q is not included in 1.1, because it is either unobserved or simply ignored, a new
error term u = βq + ε, would result:
ya = γ + δTa + ua (A.3)
and δ would be an inconsistent estimate of the ATE because E(u|1,T )6=0 due to
the correlation between q and T. The correlation of concern is actually between the
assignment value, in this case v, and q, because T is determined by v : T=T(v).
In the case of a pollution policy such as the 1990 CAAA, one possible q comes
to mind that is similar to the unobserved individual specic skill or ability discussed
in papers concerned with returns to education. In the case of pollution, the unob-
served "skill" is an area's ability for attracting people and employers. This skill will
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be correlated with high initial levels of pollution due to a larger initial population
and number of jobs, and will also be correlated with lower decreases in pollution
so long as one is willing to assume that the relative dierences in skill is perma-
nent across areas over the timeframe of the analysis. Rather than considering an
unobservable skill, one can imagine that the data will never be complete enough
to capture every area specic attribute that attracts employers and residents. For
instance, some private company information, beyond the observable level of initial
employment, may be necessary to fully account for the variation in employment
growth throughout the United States. Also, while the housing decisions of indi-
viduals may be inuenced by some undocumented area appeal in addition to the
observable geography and demographics.
It is possible to use the assignment rule and design value to break the correla-
tion between T and u without using an RD design, but it requires strong functional
form assumptions. The design value is useful due to its deterministic relationship
with treatment. This relationship results with all correlation between the error term
and the treatment necessarily being captured in: E[u|T, v] = E[u|v], or more specif-
ically: E[q|T, v] = E[q|v]. By including what is referred to as a "control function"
of v, k(v), in equation A.1, a consistent estimate of δ is produced so long as k(v)
is correctly specied: E[ya|1, Ta, va] = γ + δTa + βE[qa|1, Ta, va] + E[ξa|1, Ta, va]
= γ + δTa + βE[qa|va] (assuming E[ξa|1, Ta, va] = 0 and E[q|T, v] = E[q|v] =
γ + δTa + k(va)).
The specication of k(v) is intended to proxy βE[q|1, T, v], and thus remove the
124
dependence of q and T. A consistent estimate of δ then results through estimating:
ya = γ + δTa + k(va) + εa (A.4)
assuming E[ε|1, T, v] = 0 holds.
Unfortunately, the correct specication of k(v) presents a signicant problem
when estimating equation A.4 because the specication must be exact or the es-
timate of δ will remain inconsistent. In the "simplest" case, a linear specication
is assumed and the LATE estimate then measures the dierence between the in-
tercepts of two straight lines - one for each group. For specications other than
linearity, strong parametric assumptions need to be made (as though linearity were
not strong enough). Fortunately, an RD design removes the necessity of specify-
ing k(v) by restricting estimation to those areas with similar assignment values but
dierent treatments (see Campbell (1969) for an early introduction to RD, Hahn,
Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) more recently).








where v* is the discontinuity or cuto point for treatment so that areas with v>v*
receive the stricter regulation "treatment". The consistency of the RD estimate can
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From 1.6 it can be seen that for δRD to estimate the true δ the last term in 1.6,
which compares the expected conditional error term for areas close to the cuto
point, needs to be equal to zero. The last term in 1.6 is equal so long as sample is
restricted enough so that an underlying RD assumption, that observations around
the discontinuity points are similar other than non-attainment category, holds. In-
tuitively, an RD design restricts the sample enough so that observations are similar
and assignment mimics random assignment.
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Appendix B
Appendix: How Many Economists does it take to Change a Light




a ≡ attitude toward private and public benet of purchase
q ≡ quantity of CFLs purchased at price p
Q−i ≡ quantity of CFLs purchased by all other households
ρ ≡ percent adopted
κ ≡ proximity of adoption rate
S(ρ, κ) ≡ measure of the lelvel of social pressure
h ≡ chosen probability of being at home
h0 ≡ default probability of being at home
Proof of solution for q∗(a, p1, S1) :
Although it is discontinuous at 0, the function U(q) dened in equation 2.1
is concave over the relevant space for this proof. Therefore, there will be a unique
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solution to the maximization problem.
(i) If a ≤ a, then U(1) ≤ U(0) and thus U(q) is decreasing on the interval
[1,∞) because of concavity.1 Therefore, U(q) is maximized at q∗ = 0.
(ii) If a < a < ā, then U(1) > U(0) =⇒ q∗ > 0, and further U(1) > U(2).
Therefore: q∗ = 1.2
(iii) If ā ≤ a, then U(2) ≥ U(1) and thus q∗ ≥ 2.







p2u′′(W − pq∗) + a∂2v
∂q2
> 0
Proof of solution for h∗(a, p, S(ρ)):
Solving equation 2.2 for the optimal probability of being at home, h∗, results
in:
c′(h∗) = [u(W − pq∗)− u(W ) + av(q∗, Q−i)− av(0, Q−i)]− s(q∗) (B.1)
Because c′(h) is strictly increasing, it is possible to invert c′(h∗) and determine a
unique solution, denoted here as H ∗ (a, p, S(ρ, κ)). Because probability is bounded
1Note that this is only known for [1,∞) because of the discontinuity at 0.
2Note that it is possible that U ′(1)<0 but that q∗ = 1.
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below at 0 and above at 1, the solution h∗(a, p, S(ρ, κ)) then equals h∗(a, p, S(ρ, κ)) =
max[min[H ∗ (a, p, S(ρ, κ)), 1], 0].
First, for attitude levels a ≤ a: By the proof of solution for q∗(a, p1, S1) ,
q∗(a) = 0 for a ≤ a. It follows that c′(h∗) = −S(ρ, κ). Then, if S(ρ, κ) = 0,
h∗(a, p, 0) = h0 for a ≤ a, and if S(ρ, κ) > 0, then the right hand side of equation
B.1 is strictly negative and thus h∗(a, p, s(ρ, κ)) < h0 for a ≤ a.
Second, considering consumers with a > a: from the proof of solution for
q∗(a, p1, S1), U(q
′) > U(0) ∀ q′ > 0. By denition U(0) = u(W )+av(0, Q−i)−S(ρ, κ)
and U(q′) = u(W − pq′) + av(q′, Q−i). If S(ρ, κ) = 0 the term in brackets of
equation B.1 is equal to U(q′) − U(0), and thus c′(h∗) > 0 =⇒ h∗ > h0 for
a > a. For S(ρ, κ) > 0, once again q∗ = q′ > 0 for a > a so that s(q∗) = 0
and the term in brackets of equation B.1 is equal to U(q′) − u(W ) − av(0, Q−i) =
U(q′) − U(0) − S(ρ, κ). Let a0(p, S(ρ, κ)) ≥ a be dened as the level of attitude
for which the household is indierent between purchasing and not purchasing but
not facing social pressure (U(0) − S(ρ, κ)) so that the following equality holds:
u(W − pq∗) + a0(·)v(q∗, Q−i) = u(W ) + a0(·)v(0, Q−i). Then, if S(ρ, κ) > 0, for
a = a0, c
′(h∗) = 0 =⇒ h∗ = h0, for a > a0, c′(h∗) > 0 =⇒ h∗ > h0 and for a < a0,
c′(h∗) < 0 =⇒ h∗ < h.
Alternatively, the positive relationship between h∗and a can be shown through
the Inverse Function Theorem: Let R(a) denote the right-hand side of equation B.1.





> 0 because R(a) is continuous
and, by the Envelope Theorem, strictly increasing for all a > a. (Note: h∗(a) is
continuous by the continuity of c′(h) and R(a) over the space a > a.)
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Proof of Prediction 1
For scenario 1 (S = 0 and F (a) < 1): For S = 0, h ∗ (·) ≥ h0 and h ∗
(·) > h0∀a > a0. Since F (a) < 1, ∃ a > a0, as a = a0 when S = 0. Thus, both
pW (H) and pWOO(H) are greater than pNW (H), as both include at least some h ∗
(·) > h0 and no h ∗ (·) < h0. Further, pW (H) = pOO(H) is found trivially as
aaOO = −∞for S = 0.
For scenario 2 (S > 0 and F (a) = 1): For S > 0 and a ≤ a, h ∗ (·) < h0by the
proof of solution for h∗(a, p, S(ρ)). Thus, pNW (H) > pW (H) and pNW (H) > pOO(H)
as a ≤ a by assumption of very low attitude. Further, because aOO = a0 > a,
h∗ (·) = 0 for all observations in OO (opt out option is chosen due to social pressure
and limited positive attitude) but not in W, and thus pW (H) > pOO(H).
Proof of Predication 2
For scenario 1 (S = 0 and F (a) < 1): As in prediction 1, for S = 0, h∗(·) ≥ h0
and h ∗ (·) > h0∀a > a0. Since F (a) < 1, ∃ a > a0, as a = a0 when S = 0. Thus,
both pW (A) and pOO(A) are greater than pNW (A), as both include at least some
h∗(·) > h0 and no h∗(·) < h0 and all h∗(·) > h0purchase. Further, pW (A) = pOO(A)
is found trivially as a = a0 when S = 0.
For scenario 2 (S > 0 and F (a) = 1): For S > 0 and a ≤ a, h ∗ (·) < h0by the
proof of solution for h∗(a, p, S(ρ)). Thus, pNW (A) > pW (A) and pNW (A) > pOO(A)
as a ≤ a by assumption of very low levels attitude. Further, because a0 > a,
h∗ (·) = 0 for all observations in OO (opt out option is chosen due to social pressure
130
and limited attitude) but not in W, and thus pW (A) > pOO(A).
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